[163933] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: PRISM: NSA/FBI Internet data mining project
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Fri Jun 21 11:23:59 2013
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAPhg-wSma_bSjT-eQZXmOBk0aMqMM5POYo0VhzS3h1HbJdVk2w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2013 17:19:51 +0200
To: Phil Fagan <philfagan@gmail.com>
Cc: NANOG <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Jun 21, 2013, at 5:10 PM, Phil Fagan <philfagan@gmail.com> wrote:
> I would think this is only an issue if they throw out the Fourth in =
that when they use that data collected "inadvertantly" to build a case a =
against you they use no other data collected under a proper warrant.
That statement ignores a longstanding legal principle known as "fruit of =
the poison tree".
> If the purpose was to actually collect data on you, in the event you =
do something , they can simply run a query against this data post court =
order...then that's crossing the line.
Indeed, they don't even seem to be required to bother with the court =
order any more. The standing FISA order seems to pretty much allow them =
to do all the required line crossing without any additional court order.
> I personally think there is nothing wrong with monitoring US =
communications - big difference between monitoring US communications and =
monitoring US persons communications.
It's pretty clear that they are likely monitoring both.
Owen
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> On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Dan White <dwhite@olp.net> wrote:
> On 06/09/13 11:10 -0500, Dan White wrote:
> Let me put my gold tipped tinfoil hat on in response to your =
statement.
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> =
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant=
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> If accurate, this is extremely concerning:
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> Top secret documents submitted to the court that oversees =
surveillance by US
> intelligence agencies show the judges have signed off on broad =
orders which
> allow the NSA to make use of information "inadvertently" collected =
from
> domestic US communications without a warrant.
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> The documents show that even under authorities governing the =
collection of
> foreign intelligence from foreign targets, US communications can =
still be
> collected, retained and used.
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> ...However, alongside those provisions, the Fisa court-approved =
policies
> allow the NSA to:
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> =95 Keep data that could potentially contain details of US persons =
for up
> to five years;
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> Retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic =
communications
> if they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal =
activity,
> threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are =
believed to
> contain any information relevant to cybersecurity;
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> All protections afforded by the fourth amendment have essentially been
> thrown into the (rather large) bit bucket by the FISA court, when it =
comes
> to any bits which leave your premise.
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> --=20
> Dan White
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>=20
>=20
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> --=20
> Phil Fagan
> Denver, CO
> 970-480-7618
