[136194] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re: Level
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Tue Feb 1 17:55:02 2011
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <62092E89-6460-4240-B6F8-FDF9D161A018@ripe.net>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 14:51:21 -0800
To: Alex Band <alexb@ripe.net>
Cc: carlos@lacnic.net, nanog@nanog.org
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Feb 1, 2011, at 1:57 PM, Alex Band wrote:
>=20
> On 1 Feb 2011, at 22:20, Owen DeLong wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>> On Feb 1, 2011, at 9:14 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert =
<millnert@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Here be dragons,
>>> <snip>
>>>> It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
>>>> Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a =
Really
>>>> Bad Idea.
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
>>> How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
>>>=20
>> RPKI is a big knob governments might be tempted to turn.
>=20
> Of course we looked into this, cause we're running our service from =
Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The possibilities for law enforcement =
agencies to take measures against the Resource Certification service run =
by the RIPE NCC are extremely limited. Under Dutch law, the process of =
certification, as well as resource certificates themselves, do not =
qualify as goods that are capable of being confiscated.
>=20
Confiscated isn't the only possible issue. Being ordered to revoke a ROA =
or sign an alternate ROA isn't necessarily confiscation. It's =
court-ordered behavior. I'm not familiar enough with Dutch law to know =
if this is possible or not, but, regardless of the law today, the =
certificate issue remains after the law is changed. No country has =
immutable laws. Even the US Constitution can be (and has been) changed.
> Then of course, the decision making process always lies in the hands =
of the network operator. Only if a government would mandate an ISP to =
respect an invalid ROA and drop the route, it would be effective.=20
>=20
If the RIR is signing the "invalid" ROA, how does one distinguish the =
invalid from the valid?
> So *both* these things would have to happen before there is an =
operational issue. Like you've seen in Egypt, pulling the plug is =
easier...
>=20
Today, pulling the plug is easier. In an automated RPKI environment =
where a revocation or alternate signed record can cause service impacts,=20=
> YMMV on your side of the pond.
>=20
> Alex Band
> Product Manager, RIPE NCC
With the mere passage of a law, so could the mileage on your side of the =
pond.
Owen
