[117433] in Cypherpunks
Re: Project: Hardening Crypto Against Big Brother's "BlackBag"
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Martin Minow)
Fri Sep 3 02:43:46 1999
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In-Reply-To: <93632492129202@cs26.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 1999 23:24:32 -0700
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann), cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
From: Martin Minow <minow@pobox.com>
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Reply-To: Martin Minow <minow@pobox.com>
Sunder <sunder@brainlink.com> wrotes:
>
> >Again, what's needed is a tamper proof device (tampering by physical access
> >to the device or by some means to bypass the device in the software of the
> >computer it's inserted in). This would require that the key do it's own on
> >board crypto and not rely for ANYTHING coming from the host PC, other than a
> >communication channel.
>
You might look at the TINI internet interface from Dallas Semiconductor
<http://www.ibutton.com/TINI/index.html>. You should be able to put the
non-secure code on the TINI board and the secure code on a crypto iButton
(also from Dallas Semiconductor). The Dallas Semiconductor folk put
a lot of work into making the iButton secure from physical, power,
and timing attacks. You can program both in Java. The crypto iButton
can't be exported without a license.
Tini evaluation units cost $50 (plus connectors) from their web page.
(Note: I'm not associated with Dallas Semiconductor.)
Martin Minow
minow@pobox.com
