[117082] in Cypherpunks
Re: Project: Hardening Crypto Against Big Brother's "Black Bag"
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Frantz)
Thu Aug 26 03:53:27 1999
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In-Reply-To: <v03130308b3e3454425d2@[207.111.242.79]>
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Date: Wed, 25 Aug 1999 21:49:43 -0700
To: Tim May <tcmay@got.net>, cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com>
Reply-To: Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com>
At 11:05 AM -0700 8/20/99, Tim May wrote:
>I assume it's some kind of keyboard sniffer, to catch passphrases and/or
>typed text. They can't plausibly monkey with PGP itself without affecting
>already-issued public keys, it seems to me. Maybe someone can think of a
>way they could weaken PGP without affecting already-issued keys. Of course,
>if they do the black bag job early enough they could compromise the keys
>themselves, by interfering with the random number generators and suchlike.
>This doesn't strike me as being very useful, given the persistence of keys
>for years...
Replace the random number generator with the machine time with suitable
whitening. Now the symmetric encryption for every PGP message is based on
a 32 bit key. If you know when the message was created, you have an even
smaller search space.
Keep a SHA hash of your binaries, and a secure boot disk to re-run the hash.
One question is, what is the best way to know that the men in black have
been there without them knowing that you know?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz | The availability and use of secure encryption may |
Periwinkle | offer an opportunity to reclaim some portion of |
Consulting | the privacy we have lost. - B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge |
