[460] in libertarians
Re: term limits, etc
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Vernon Imrich)
Tue Dec 6 19:01:40 1994
To: libertarians@MIT.EDU
Date: Tue, 06 Dec 1994 18:59:16 EST
From: Vernon Imrich <vimrich@MIT.EDU>
|> >>1) proportional representation: if the Republicans receive 45% of the
|> I dislike the idea of institutionalizing parties and eliminating
|> independents. If this is done where all candidates go to Washington with a
|> fractional amount of vote, I'm still opposed, but not strongly and based
|> primarily on a gut feeling. It would certainly complicate the system,
|> especially if you try to include term limits; would it count as .03 terms if
|> you only have .03 votes?
I think a run-off system is the best by far. It has some of the aspects
of STV systems, but is less prone to counting and transfer difficulties,
and ends the kind of winner take all power that PR systems try to end.
A run off system requires a candidate get 50% of the vote to win. Thus,
every vote not FOR candidate A is the same as a vote AGAINST candidate A.
Thus, if 2% or 5% or 20% goes to a third party, it is not wasted in
the sense that no "worse of two evils" will be helped by it. Then, when
the top two vote getters go to a run-off election, the guy in second
place may have to reach out to the 20% (or whatever) for support. It
then becomes clear who's got the power and why, and makes candidates
think twice about angering their swing votes before the next election.
Thus, the loosers get some say/effect on the process, though they have no
candidate in office. (Note that should the 20% opt to stay home in
the run off if no one placates them this has important consequences to
the outcome.)
This kind of thing actually happened in GA a few years ago. The D and R
got something like a 49-48% split with 3% Libertarian. The R, would have
lost in a winner take all deal, but won instead in the run off, by
making some concessions to the libertarian voters, and coming out 51-49
ahead. Rather than a wasted 3%, the Libs were the sought after swing vote.
Finally, consider the '92 presidential race. With the voters assured
that a vote for Perot would equally prevent Bush AND Clinton from
office Perot might have been able to run an entirely different campaign
and bunched up at close to 30%. No telling who would have had to
make concessions to who. Not that I'm a Perot fan but the whole concept
of "don't vote Perot, we have to stop XXX" would be out the window
since a vote for Perot WOULD be a vote to stop XXX. The possiblities
would be more complex than the NFL playoff picture.
|> >The term limits idea is not so much about reducing the power of the
|> >politicians as it is leveling it. It allows the voters to have more
|> >fair representation as each district's legislator is more or less of
|> >the same order of power as everyone else's. Yes, those who move
|> >up will keep their contacts and some clout, but they'll be at the
|> >bottom rung of any senority system.
|>
|> If the problem is with the seniority system, should we just get rid of this?
It's not just seniority though. There are a host of parlimentary
augmentations that naturally flow to those who've been in the body
long enough.
|> I dislike much of the House and (to a lesser extent) Senate systems of rules,
|> and this is high on my list of things to dislike.
The trouble with rules reform is that its sort of like removing the
reason for representatives in the first place. The main driving force
for a republican government is to separate the deliberative process
from the "wild swings of the populace" and to limit the debate so that
things can get done. Take away their ability to set the rules for that
deliberation and you're taking away their main power as legislators.
A better way seems to me to give them the power, but then check it
uniformly every so often to keep it in line.
|> What purpose do term limits on the President serve? I haven't made up my
|> mind yet on congressional term limits, but I oppose the limits on the
|> President; it reduces the power of the voter to choose who is to govern
|> him/her, without the leveling out that vimrich refers to.
The presidential term limits springs from something very different
in my mind. It appears to me to be more a way of preventing a
dictatorship. I think there was some fear that a President could
mmaintain his/her position indefinately through war and or other
executive emergencies. It has been very rare to change the commander
in chief in the middle of a war. The one time I can think of is
Vietnam, which unlike the others, was more divisive than uniting.
The experience of Hitler in Germany is ominous. Many of those who
opposed him found it impossible to stop him once they'd gotten
into a war, before that time of course, their warnings were not
believed, while afterwards it was too late. Thus the presidential term
limits sort of put a cap on anyone's desires to usurp the power of the
presidency for their own aims. Given the kind of covert operations
the Reagan branch had been getting into (and we can't always count
on the press to catch everything) I think it's a worthwile protection.
A brief look at our history shows that even our strict separation
of powers has been very inept at curtailing executive abuses in
time of war. Lincoln suspended half the Bill of Rights, FDR had
the interrment camps for Japanese Americans and took over many
industries, Nixon got in to spying on US citizens, and on down
the line. The strength of law is just not that strong in such times.
To try to suspend the constitution itself on term limits would at
least be a stronger obstacle. The other items are open for some
kind of interpretation. Term limits are not. Taking them on
would make the populace more suspicious than anything else.
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| Vernon Imrich | market failure, n. The inabilty of the |
| MIT OE, Rm 5-329b | market to recover from a blow by |
| Cambridge, MA 02139 | intervention. (The Exchange) |
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