[337] in libertarians
Term Limits Guest column Printed
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Vernon Imrich)
Wed Oct 26 13:56:31 1994
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 94 13:51:46 -0400
From: vimrich@flying-cloud.mit.edu (Vernon Imrich)
To: libertarians@MIT.EDU
In case you missed my guest column...
"Term Limits is a Needed Reform"
Vernon Imrich, (c) 1994
Printed in The Tech, Tuesday, October 25
(may re-distribute, but don't plagiarize or alter)
The debate over term limits for political office holders has been
quietly but persistantly raging across this country. This November,
Massachussetts could become the fifteenth state to join the movement if
the voters approve ballot question four. For the scores of MIT's locally
registered student voters, this election will be the first chance to voice
your opinions on this issue.
Unfortunately, the term limits debate has been largely portrayed as
anti-incumbency emotionalism fighting against the desperate attacks of
career politicians. The result has been the depiction of term limits as a
knee-jerk, overly simplistic reform without much foundation. A more
dispassionate analysis of the idea, however, reveals it to be a necessary,
timely, and entirely reasonable reform, based on nothing more than the idea
of "balance of power" upon which our government rests.
The founders of the Constitution knew that elections alone were not
enough of a check on any system of representational governance. They broke up
the federal government into three branches, each with the power to check the
other, even making one immue to direct elections. From that moment on, the
idea that our right to vote should be procedurally unlimited was thrown out
the window. Our vote was limited to that of one US Representative, two
Senators and one President each. Still not satisfied with these protections
against abuse, the Constitution was quickly amended with the Bill of Rights.
Those amendments said that even the majority could not vote for certain
things. We could not vote to limit speech or the press, or the right to jury
trials, to name a few.
The Constitution sets out exactly what we could and could not vote for
because voting is an exercise of political power. In a democracy, that power
is confered to the people. The voters are just as likely to abuse this power
as those they vote for. Without a commitment to basic rights, due process,
and procedural balance, democracy would be nothing more than mob rule. Term
limits rectifies one such procedural imbalance that, until recently, was not
of great importance -- the power of incumbency.
It has long been the case that incumbent legislators had more control
over the legislative process than newer members. This was and is entirely
appropriate. Senior members have a better understanding of the process,
have more experience, and are better suited to guide what, due to time, must
be a limited debate. Rarely though, did these powers confer any special
benefits on the districts a legislator represented. The federal budget was
roughly a quarter of its current size relative to the economy, and was
almost entirely spent on national defense. For that reason, original
proposals to limit terms were deemed unnecessary.
With the advent of an agressively regulatory and service based
government, begun primarily with the New Deal in the 30's, an avenue for
imbalance was created that has never been corrected. Incumbent legislators
were no longer mere representatives of constituient ideaology, but were now
deliverers of tangible services, subsidies, mandates, regulations, and
patronage positions. This new, or at least greatly magnified, power to
deliver services resulted in a magnification of the power of incumbancy, and
particularly, the imbalance of that power. A legislator with more control
of the process could bring home a larger share of the new federal pie. Now
the officer was judged not only by ideaology but on positioning in the federal
power structure. This change is easily documented. From 1790 to 1932, the
turnover rate in the US House averaged 41 percent, since 1932 the average has
been cut by more than half to 17 percent.[1] Between 1810 and 1950, only
four times did the incumbents' rate of reelection exceed 90 percent, since
1950, only four times has it fallen below 90 percent and never has it fallen
below 86.6 percent.[2] In that same period, however, displeasure with
government has consistently risen.
The voters are clearly caught in a trap. Angry voters can vote for the
challenger and get their ideas better represented, but the challenger will
have no power to enact them when elected to a sea of powerful incumbents.
Pragmatic voters can vote for the incumbent, who has the power to protect
their district and may even represent their views, but must then face the
same type of politician from every other district. A teaching hospital in
Massachussetts may hate Ted Kennedy's plan for universal health care, but
knows he will at least work to exempt them from damage if elected. A
farmer in Kansas may dislike Bob Dole's spending cuts, but knows that at
least the farm subsidies will remain intact with Dole to protect them. When
both succeed, budgets soar and there is no way for either district to
unilaterally stop the escalation.
Term limits is that solution. It is a way for the voters of Kansas
and Massachussetts to BOTH give up their positions of power equally. At
the state level it is a way for Somerville to balance its power with
South Boston. It restores balance to the process by ensuring that procedural
advantages are short lived. Voters need not worry about a politician's
position in the power structure, only her position on the issues.
Some suggest that we only need to enact some sort of rules reform rather
than blanket limitation on terms of office. The problem is, there's not just
one or two simple rules to address. There are senority rules, closed rules,
parlimentary powers, committee asignments, simply deciding what committees to
create, franking privileges, personal contacts, and districting to name a few.
The Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to correct the last issue alone and
only regarding racial preferencing and is still in court at all levels over
ten years later.
Others call instead for campaign finance reform. While it may very
well also be needed, it can only address certain campaign problems (most
notably the system of institutionalized bribery) not incumbency. The voters
are not re-electing incumbents because they have more money than challengers.
The voters are doing it to save themselves their precious political position.
Only in the most extreme cases will the need for change outweigh the ability
of the incumbent to protect and service his constituiency. In election
terms its called balancing change with loss of clout.
Of course, the common problem with any of these other solutions is that
no incumbent stands to gain by any such reform, while the power to enact the
reform is vested entirely in incumbents. Then, even supposing we could get
them to stop political jockying somehow and pass some of these reforms, how
could we correct all the intangible imbalances like personal contacts and
"party clout." Incumbency inherently grants some districts or states more
say than others in the political process. It is precisely due to that
imbalance of power that none of these reforms can be achieved.
A few argue that term limits has bad side effects. It could create
both a congress full of lame ducks and a congress of more easily manipulated
newcomers. Well, the first has often proved to be a benefit. Legislators
can concentrate on the issues and their beliefs, without constantly worrying
about getting re-elected and the necessary spin control. Furthermore, as
presidential politics has shown, lame duck office holders are always
reluctant to ruin their party's chances to elect a successor in the next
election. The second problem of political newcomers, is countered in many
ways by the first. Manipulations by lobbiests will be less important as the
legislator will not have to worry about preserving a political career through
satisfying special interests. And the loss of experience will be countered
by elected officials being more in touch with the private sector they only
recently left and to which they will soon return.
Term limits is universal, impervious to partisan wrangling, leaves
little room for judicial interpretation, and can be applied directly
by the voters and states. It is the only reform that addresses the chronic
problems with our political system. There are costs of course. We will loose
some of the good representatives with the bad. But there were costs to
efficiency in splitting the government into separate branches. There were
costs to home rule and community standards by adopting a Bill of Rights. In
every case the benefits have been worth the costs. The instances of abuse,
imbalance and corruption in our current system are two numerous to mention.
It is now an inescapable fact that the legislative process is out of control,
no matter who we elect. In that sense, voting for term limits may be the
most important vote you could ever cast.
[1] "Restoration," George F. Will, Free Press (Macmillan) c1992, pg. 73
[2] ibid, pg. 77
