[2567] in Kerberos_V5_Development
Re: Prototype hell
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Tom Yu)
Mon Oct 13 03:50:15 1997
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 1997 03:50:10 -0400
To: Ken Hornstein <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
Cc: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU>, krbdev@MIT.EDU
From: Tom Yu <tlyu@MIT.EDU>
In-Reply-To: <199710102023.QAA16305@ginger.cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
>>>>> "kenh" == Ken Hornstein <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil> writes:
kenh> It makes things easier when you depend on the mathematical
kenh> properties of 32-bit integers ... such as when you're shifting
kenh> bits around when doing DES calculations, for instance. I'd
kenh> agree that's a bug too, but I was going for minimum work :-)
So where exactly is it failing? A quick perusal of the Ferguson DES
implementation that we're using reveals a few points where bits beyond
the least significant 32 might get clobbered, but this shouldn't
matter because nothing tries to use them (everything that right-shifts
an unsigned KRB5_INT32 masks the result sanely as far as I can see).
Is it the actual DES verification test that is failing? Or is it
something like the MD{4,5} or CRC32 or SHA tests that are failing?
---Tom
