[539] in Intrusion Detection Systems
Re: Intrusions
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Tim Keanini)
Tue Feb 6 08:15:14 1996
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 1996 08:11:08 -0800 (PST)
From: Tim Keanini <blast@worldbit.com>
To: ids@uow.edu.au
In-Reply-To: <9601310334.AA08507@all.net>
Reply-To: ids@uow.edu.au
On Tue, 30 Jan 1996, Fred Cohen wrote:
> > On Sun, 28 Jan 1996, Paul G. Seldes wrote:
> >
> > > One thing to keep in mind is that it is often to ensure that intruders can't do
> > > anything on a system rather than try to prevent them from intruding in the first place.
> > > If you break into a safe, and there is nothing there....you leave.
> > > This angle works for many businesses and users.
>
> Why have a safe if there's nothing in it?
Another issue that ALWAYS gets confused is the trasitive trust issue.
If you break into computerA, and sure there is nothing in it but there
is some trust by the backup machine, some file servers, any thing else,
you have got a problem.
We are talking about a network and not just a single computer. I dont think
people who build safes join them together and if they did, they sure would
make sure that if one melted down, the other would not be effected....even
if there was nothing in the safe that was on fire.
> If the content of your computer is worthless, why have a computer?
Whew, that is a big one. First, worthless has to be qualified by
senior management and not the end user becuase it is
their sandbox that you are playing in.
--blast
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