[98219] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Why do we use facilities with EPO's?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Stephen Wilcox)
Thu Jul 26 06:33:28 2007
Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2007 11:24:11 +0100
From: Stephen Wilcox <steve.wilcox@packetrade.com>
To: David Lesher <wb8foz@nrk.com>
Cc: nanog list <nanog@merit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <200707252347.TAA14510@sigma.nrk.com>
Errors-To: owner-nanog@merit.edu
On Wed, Jul 25, 2007 at 07:47:48PM -0400, David Lesher wrote:
> I've never designed or looked into a EPO installation; but I'm
> astonished such does not use a Normally-Closed pushbutton in a
> fail-to-off circuit.
>
> Similarly...
>
> If you have electric locks on your exit doors; every installation
> I have seen has a couple of such aspects:
>
> a) You must have an exit override. If an electric strike, an
> interior knob is good. If a [Locknetics-style] mag-lock, you
> need an exit button. That button SHALL be a NC pushbutton in
> series with the magnet. [In other words... No, you can't have
> the pushbutton connected back to some controller box on the 3rd
> floor where it generates an interupt that will drop the lock
> power... or it's supposed to...]
Sorry I've seen a few that dont have an exit override.
> b) When the building fire drop is pulled, you SHALL drop the lock
> power to the mag locks.
I've seen at least one that does not do this.
> And while local fire codes vary widely; given those were in the
> rules for a USG SCIF I worked in; I somehow doubt you'll be able
> to get more lenient treatment based on the import of the data
> center's operation.
That depends on a bunch of criteria.. override buttons and failure when power goes out create significant security risks. If you are a bank or have very secure data then you might consider these to be ways in which an intruder might compromise your security.
From what I've seen tho, when you remove the ability to exit in this way then you also find you have a lot of control procedures imposed to avoid unnecessary risk to employees or visitors.
Steve
