[59849] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Cisco vulnerability and dangerous filtering techniques
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Richard A Steenbergen)
Wed Jul 23 02:00:14 2003
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 01:59:37 -0400
From: Richard A Steenbergen <ras@e-gerbil.net>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: alex@yuriev.com, nanog@merit.edu
In-Reply-To: <200307222153.h6MLrjXb003556@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
On Tue, Jul 22, 2003 at 05:53:45PM -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Tue, 22 Jul 2003 17:51:20 EDT, alex@yuriev.com said:
>
> > I guess all folks with Ph.D. at Akamai really are paid for nothing if a
> > virus could calculate that with a few traceroutes.
>
> It's actually pretty easy if you get 20K distributed zombies doing the
> traceroutes and then distributing the data to each other. Given that
> data, it's pretty easy to compute the graph - every router running BGP
> has to do similar. :)
Sounds like said virus implementor should go into the optimized routing
business. Personally I'm gonna call bullshit on that one until I see it
done.
> The Akamai problem is how to do it *without* having 20K boxes doing
> traceroutes. ;)
How many boxes does Akamai have? :)
--
Richard A Steenbergen <ras@e-gerbil.net> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras
GPG Key ID: 0xF8B12CBC (7535 7F59 8204 ED1F CC1C 53AF 4C41 5ECA F8B1 2CBC)
