[41775] in North American Network Operators' Group
RE: Analysis from a JHU CS Prof
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Roeland Meyer)
Wed Sep 12 04:29:20 2001
Message-ID: <EA9368A5B1010140ADBF534E4D32C728069EA1@condor.mhsc.com>
From: Roeland Meyer <rmeyer@mhsc.com>
To: 'Vadim Antonov' <avg@exigengroup.com>, nanog@merit.edu
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2001 01:02:47 -0700
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|> From: Vadim Antonov [mailto:avg@exigengroup.com]
|> Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2001 9:21 PM
|>
|> Locked bulletproof door to the cockpit. Survelliance cameras in the
|> passenger compartments. That all which was needed to foil
|> the attack. Now
|> I think it's time to ask why this isn't the standard procedure?
"Bulletproof" is not needed when you can't get guns aboard. Guns are as
dangerous to the hijacker as to anyone else. They can puncture the pressure
hull. Readywhip has been the standard answer to survalance cameras for
years. Locks don't do you any good if they aren't used.
The real big problem is that we haven't had a hijacking in almost 10 years
and no serious terrorism activity since the mid-'70's. The answer then is
the same as now, SOGs specifically tasked to take out terrorist bases and
training camps. But, that was in the daze of Scair America and BlackOps
Rangers.
