[32385] in North American Network Operators' Group
RE: ISPs as content-police or method-police
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Roeland Meyer)
Mon Nov 20 18:16:34 2000
Message-ID: <47FE39302BF73B4C93BC84B87341282C1F1A@condor.lvrmr.mhsc.com>
From: Roeland Meyer <rmeyer@mhsc.com>
To: "'Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu'" <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>,
Roeland Meyer <rmeyer@mhsc.com>
Cc: nanog@merit.edu
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 15:03:36 -0800
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Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing@merit.edu
> From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu [mailto:Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu]
> Sent: Monday, November 20, 2000 1:34 PM
>
> On Mon, 20 Nov 2000 13:16:00 PST, Roeland Meyer
> <rmeyer@mhsc.com> said:
> > We have enough problems from DOS attacks originating from the script
> > kiddies, we don't need DOS attacks from our upstreams
> > (uncontracted/unrequested port filtering).
>
> The two are inversely related.
How? Denial of service because of script-kiddie activity is
indistinguishable from denial of service because the transit provider is
arbitrarily blocking those ports, or has firewalled my systems "for my own
good", without my permission.
DoS is DoS.
