[194263] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Microsoft O365 labels nanog potential fraud?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Carl Byington)
Wed Mar 29 12:03:34 2017
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
From: Carl Byington <carl@five-ten-sg.com>
To: nanog@nanog.org
In-Reply-To: <CAP-guGXrbRRgYsbxWGRtnwhkxYKYfN2Ex7B_hjhoy+NGHM0YbQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 09:00:02 -0700
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
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On Wed, 2017-03-29 at 11:32 -0400, William Herrin wrote:
> The gold standard, Spamassassin, does not. Indeed, the message to
> which I reply was scored by spam assassin as "SPF_PASS" even though
> you do not include NANOG's servers in the SPF record for
> tnetconsulting.net.
The message from Mr. Taylor (to which Mr. Herrin is replying) arrived
here with:
Return-path: <nanog-bounces@nanog.org>
From: Grant Taylor via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org>
Reply-to: Grant Taylor <gtaylor@tnetconsulting.net>
So an SPF implementation that checks either or both of the (rfc2821
envelope from / rfc2822 header from) domains will pass.
The original was DKIM signed by d=tnetconsulting.net (c=simple/simple -
you might want to change that) but of course that signature was broken
by the nanog list handling.
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=SEM6
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