[163929] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: net neutrality and peering wars continue
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Fri Jun 21 10:53:53 2013
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <51C46125.3020405@queuefull.net>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2013 16:48:32 +0200
To: Benson Schliesser <bensons@queuefull.net>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Jun 21, 2013, at 4:20 PM, Benson Schliesser <bensons@queuefull.net> =
wrote:
> On 2013-06-21 4:54 AM, Bill Woodcock wrote:
>> Again, this only matters if you place a great deal of importance both =
on the notion that size equals fairness, and that fairness is more =
important than efficiency.
>> ...
>>> I think the point is here that networks are nudging these decisions =
by making certain services suck more than others by way of preferential =
network access.
>> I agree completely that that's the problem. But it didn't appear to =
be what Benson was talking about.
>>=20
>=20
> It's clear to me that you don't understand what I've said. But whether =
you're being obtuse or simply disagreeing, there is little value in =
repeating my specific points. Instead, in hope of encouraging useful =
discussion, I'll try to step back and describe things more broadly.
>=20
> The behaviors of networks are driven (in almost all cases) by the =
needs of business. In other words, decisions about peering, performance, =
etc, are all driven by a P&L sheet.
This isn't exactly true and it turns out that the subtle difference from =
this fact is very important.
They are driven not by a P&L sheet, but by executive's opinions of what =
will improve the P&L sheet.
There is ample evidence that promiscuous peering can actually reduce =
costs across the board and increase revenues, image, good will, =
performance, and even transit purchases.
There is also evidence that turning off peers tends to hamper revenue =
growth, degrade performance, create a negative image for the =
organization, reduce good will, etc.
One need look no further than the history of SPRINT for a graphic =
example. In the early 2000's when SPRINT started depeering, they were =
darn near the epicenter of internet transit. Today, they're yet another =
also ran among major telco-based ISPs.
Sure, their peering policy alone is likely not the only cause of this =
decline in stature, but it certainly contributed.
> So, clearly, these networks will try to minimize their costs (whether =
"fair" or not). And any imbalance between peers' cost burdens is an easy =
target. If one peer's routing behavior forces the other to carry more =
traffic a farther distance, then there is likely to be a dispute at some =
point - contrary to some hand-wave comments, carrying multiple gigs of =
traffic across the continent does have a meaningful cost, and pushing =
that cost onto somebody else is good for business.
Reasonable automation means that it costs nearly nothing to add peers at =
public exchange points once you are present at that exchange point. The =
problem with looking only at the cost of moving the bits around in this =
equation is that it ignores where the value proposition for delivering =
those bits lies.
In reality, if an eyeball ISP doesn't maintain sufficient peering =
relationships to deliver the traffic the eyeballs are requesting, the =
eyeballs will become displeased with said ISP. In many cases, this is =
less relevant than it should be because the eyeball network is either a =
true monopoly, an effective monopoly (30/10Mbps cable vs. 1.5Mbps/384k =
DSL means that cable is an effective monopoly for all practical =
purposes), or a duopoly where both choices are nearly equally poor.
In markets served by multiple high speed providers, you tend to find =
that consumers gravitate towards the ones that don't engage in peering =
wars to the point that they degrade service to those customers.
On the other hand, if a content provider does not maintain sufficient =
capacity to reach the eyeball networks in a way that the eyeball =
networks are willing to accept said traffic, the content provider is at =
risk of losing subscribers. Since content tends to have many competitors =
capable of delivering an equivalent service, content providers have less =
leverage in any such dispute. Their customers don't want to hear "You're =
on Comcast and they don't like us" as an excuse when the service doesn't =
work. They'll go find a provider Comcast likes.
The bottom line is that these ridiculous disputes are expensive to both =
sides and degrade service for their mutual customers. I make a point of =
opening tickets every time this becomes a performance issue for me. If =
more consumers did, then perhaps that cost would help drive better =
decisions from the executives at these providers.
The other problem that plays into this is, as someone noted, many of =
these providers are in the internet business as a secondary market for =
revenue added to their primary business. They'd rather not see their =
primary business revenues driven onto the internet and off of their =
traditional services. As such, there is a perceived P&L gain to the =
other services by degrading the performance of competing services =
delivered over the internet. Attempting to use this fact to leverage =
(extort) money from the content providers to make up those revenues also =
makes for an easy target in the board room.
> This is where so-called "bit mile peering" agreements can help - =
neutralize arguments about balance in order to focus on what matters. Of =
course there is still the "P" side of a P&L sheet to consider, and =
networks will surely attempt to capture some of the success of their =
peers' business models. But take away the legitimate "fairness" excuses =
and we can see the real issue in these cases.
The problem I see with "bit mile peering" agreements is that the =
measurement of traffic that would be necessary to make such an agreement =
function reliably and verifiably by both sides would likely cost more =
than the moving of the traffic in question. I'd hate to see the internet =
degrade to telco style billing where it often cost $0.90 of every $1 =
collected to cover the costs of the call accounting and billing systems.
> Not that we have built the best (standard, interoperable, cheap) tools =
to make bit-mile peering possible... But that's a good conversation to =
have.
It might be an interesting conversation to have, but at the end of the =
day, I am concerned that the costs of the tools and their operations =
exceeds the cost being accounted. In such a case, it is often better to =
simply write off the cost.
It's like trying to recover all the screws/nuts/washers that fall on the =
floor in an assembly plant in order to save money. The cost of =
retrieving and sorting them vastly exceeds their value.
Owen
