[163732] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: huawei
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jimmy Hess)
Sat Jun 15 07:57:36 2013
In-Reply-To: <CAMrdfRxy=3aGDK--4ReGLnf=+SB+_pUVk0+uuWD3qAGqBThQ_g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2013 06:57:16 -0500
From: Jimmy Hess <mysidia@gmail.com>
To: Scott Helms <khelms@zcorum.com>
Cc: NANOG <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On 6/15/13, Scott Helms <khelms@zcorum.com> wrote:
> They're terrible places for gathering non-targeted information because the
> amount of data flowing through them means that that the likelihood of any
> give packet having any value is very very low. If the goal includes
[snip]
The probability of a low-likelihood or infrequent event approaches
100%, given sufficient time, persistence, and creativity. Even if
1% or less of packets passing through are interesting; that happens
to be more than enough to provide a snoop gains, and cause damage to
a legitimate user.
The potential existence of 'better' options; doesn't mean backdooring
of routers wouldn't be included in part of a nation state or other bad
actor's backdooring program.
--
-JH
