[162701] in North American Network Operators' Group

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Re: Tier1 blackholing policy?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Patrick W. Gilmore)
Tue Apr 30 11:54:22 2013

From: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick@ianai.net>
In-Reply-To: <517FE206.5070306@dfn.de>
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 11:53:54 -0400
To: NANOG list <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org

On Apr 30, 2013, at 11:23 , Thomas Schmid <schmid@dfn.de> wrote:
> On 30.04.2013 17:07, Chris Boyd wrote:
>> On Tue, 2013-04-30 at 10:59 -0400, ML wrote:

>>> 1) Do nothing - They're supposed deliver any and all bits
>>> (Disregarding
>>> a DoS or similiar situation which impedes said network)
>>> 2) Prefix filter - Don't be a party (at least in one direction) to =
the
>>> bad actors traffic.
>>=20
>> 3 - Deliver all packets unless I've signed up for an enhanced =
security
>> offering?
>=20
> right - I see this really as something that should be decided at the =
edge
> of the internet (Tier2+) and not in the core.

"Core"? Seriously?

Which of these statements are true:

A) Is it impossible for an end user or business (i.e. non-ISP) to get a =
direct connection to a "Tier 1" (whatever the hell that means) provider.
B) Most traffic on the Internet traverses Tier 1s today.
C) A Tier 1 has a different profit motive than a Tier 2 (whatever the =
hell that means) providers.
D) All Tier 1 providers are larger than all Tier 2 providers.

We'll just skip over the E) all of the above.

--=20
TTFN,
patrick

P.S. Hint: If you answered A, B, C, or D, you aren't paying attention.



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