[146896] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: OT: Traffic Light Control (was Re: First real-world SCADA attack
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Joel jaeggli)
Fri Nov 25 14:35:52 2011
Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2011 11:34:47 -0800
From: Joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
To: Jay Ashworth <jra@baylink.com>
In-Reply-To: <32105601.3727.1321978614923.JavaMail.root@benjamin.baylink.com>
Cc: NANOG <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On 11/22/11 08:16 , Jay Ashworth wrote:
> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Owen DeLong" <owen@delong.com>
>
>> As in all cases, additional flexibility results in additional ability
>> to make mistakes. Simple mechanical lockouts do not scale to the
>> modern world. The benefits of these additional capabilities far
>> outweigh the perceived risks of programming errors.
>
> The perceived risk in this case is "multiple high-speed traffic fatalities".
>
> I believe we rank that pretty high; it's entirely possible that a traffic
> light controller is the most potentially dangerous artifact (in terms of
> number of possible deaths) that the average citizen interacts with on a
> daily basis.
Cars generically cause at lot more deaths than faulty traffic
controllers 13.2 per 100,000 population in the US annually.
