[136184] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re: Level
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Benson Schliesser)
Tue Feb 1 17:18:20 2011
From: Benson Schliesser <bensons@queuefull.net>
In-Reply-To: <26844B7B-7B84-4066-9651-D4375055986F@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 16:05:42 -0600
To: Arturo Servin <arturo.servin@gmail.com>
Cc: NANOG Operators' Group <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Feb 1, 2011, at 3:43 PM, Arturo Servin wrote:
> Is it really a better alternative? Do we want to pay the cost of =
a fully distributed RPKI architecture?
>=20
> Or do we just abandon the idea of protecting the routing =
infrastructure?
>=20
> There is no free-lunch, we just need to select the price that we =
want to pay.
>=20
I agree there is no free-lunch.
Randy Bush addressed the problem, in a recent email, by contrasting his =
"security" personality against his mistrust of authority. (That's my =
summary, not his words.) And I think that's exactly what I'm struggling =
with. I want to secure the routing infrastructure, but I don't =
completely trust centralized regimes. At their best, they're a target =
for exploitation - at their worst, they're authoritarian.
Randy was kind enough to point me toward =
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-00 which I'm in the =
process of reading. Perhaps there is a way to balance between "fully =
distributed" and "centralized", e.g. by supporting multiple roots and =
different trust domains.
Cheers,
-Benson
> On 1 Feb 2011, at 16:29, Benson Schliesser wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>> On Feb 1, 2011, at 11:14 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert =
<millnert@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Here be dragons,
>>> <snip>
>>>> It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
>>>> Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a =
Really
>>>> Bad Idea.
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
>>> How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
>>=20
>> In theory at least, entities closer to the RPKI root (RIRs, IANA) =
could invalidate routes for any sort of policy reasons. This might =
provide leverage to certain governments, perhaps even offering the =
ability to control routing beyond their jurisdiction.
>>=20
>> As an example, it's imaginable that the US government could require =
IANA or ARIN to delegate authority to the NSA for a Canadian ISP's =
routes. Feel free to replace the RIR/LIR and country names, to suit =
your own example.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>> -Benson
>>=20
>>=20
>=20
>=20
