[136167] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re: Level
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Benson Schliesser)
Tue Feb 1 16:35:59 2011
From: Benson Schliesser <bensons@queuefull.net>
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTinBYJvGLLMpJ0z25riREA-+gq3cf++4H2FXMH54@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2011 15:29:53 -0600
To: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org, carlos@lacnic.net
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Feb 1, 2011, at 11:14 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert <millnert@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>> Here be dragons,
> <snip>
>> It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
>> Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a Really
>> Bad Idea.
>>=20
>=20
> how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
> How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
In theory at least, entities closer to the RPKI root (RIRs, IANA) could =
invalidate routes for any sort of policy reasons. This might provide =
leverage to certain governments, perhaps even offering the ability to =
control routing beyond their jurisdiction.
As an example, it's imaginable that the US government could require IANA =
or ARIN to delegate authority to the NSA for a Canadian ISP's routes. =
Feel free to replace the RIR/LIR and country names, to suit your own =
example.
Cheers,
-Benson
