[128661] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: Lightly used IP addresses
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Owen DeLong)
Fri Aug 13 19:20:35 2010
From: Owen DeLong <owen@delong.com>
In-Reply-To: <20100813183143.GV2582@sizone.org>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2010 16:16:31 -0700
To: Ken Chase <ken@sizone.org>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Errors-To: nanog-bounces+nanog.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@nanog.org
On Aug 13, 2010, at 11:31 AM, Ken Chase wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 13, 2010 at 02:15:51PM -0400, John R. Levine said:
>>>> I don't entirely understand the process. Here's the flow chart as =
far
>>>> as I've figured it out:
>>>>=20
>>>> 1. A sells a /20 of IPv4 space to B for, say, $5,000
>>>>=20
>>>> 2. A tells ARIN to transfer the chunk to B
>>>>=20
>>>> 3. ARIN says no, B hasn't shown that they need it
>>>>=20
>>>> 4. A and B say screw it, and B announces the space anyway
>>>>=20
>>>> 5. ???
>>>=20
>>> 6. ARIN receives a fraud/abuse complaint that A's space is being =
used=20
>>> by B.
>>> 7. ARIN discovers that A is no longer using the space in accordance=20=
>>> with their RSA
>>> 8. ARIN reclaims the space and A and B are left to figure out who =
owes=20
>>> what to whom.
>>=20
>> 9. A and B ignore ARIN's email and continue to announce what they've =
been=20
>> announcing.
>>=20
>> 10. ARIN attempts to allocate the /20 to someone else, who is not =
amused.
>>=20
>> Note that at this point ARIN presumably has no more v4 space left, so =
a=20
>> threat never to allocate more space to A or B isn't very scary. =
Given its=20
>> limited practical leverage, ARIN is only effective insofar as its =
members=20
>> and customers agree that playing by ARIN's rules is more beneficial =
than=20
>> ignoring them.
>=20
> Right, and Im answering my own question here, for (8) about the =
reclaiming -=20
> what upstream is going to stop carrying prefixes from a downstream =
that's
> 'illegally' announcing them? Is this upstream going to cut that =
customer off and
> lose the revenue, just to satisfy ARIN's bleating? =46rom what I =
gather, all that
> ARIN can do is remove the NS records for the i-a.a reverse zone for =
the offending
> block, making SMTP a little trickier from the block, but not much =
else.
>=20
ARIN can do quite a bit more if the resources are under RSA. If they are =
legacy
resources (which I don't believe there are such things as legacy /20s), =
then,
it's a bit murkier, but, I wouldn't completely count ARIN out.
> Unless I didnt see the other large sticks ARIN's carrying? I've never =
seen them
> send hired goons to anyone's door... yet?
Contract law anyone? Perhaps you should re-read your RSAs.
Owen
