[107495] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: BCP38 dismissal
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Patrick W. Gilmore)
Thu Sep 4 13:06:18 2008
From: "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick@ianai.net>
To: NANOG list <nanog@merit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <2EB68782-AF2E-4E5E-8194-43A4C355E302@netconsonance.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2008 13:05:16 -0400
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
On Sep 4, 2008, at 12:52 PM, Jo Rhett wrote:
> Count you which way? You seem to agree with me. Everyone should be
> doing both, not discounting BCP38 because they aren't seeing an
> attack right now.
No one sees attacks that BCP38 would stop?
Wow, I thought things like the Kaminsky bug were big news. I guess
all that was for nothing?
(Yes, I am being sarcastic. Anyone who thinks attacks which BCP 38
would stop are not happening in the wild is .. I believe the phrase
used was "confused and misinformed".)
--
TTFN,
patrick
> On Sep 4, 2008, at 9:50 AM, John C. A. Bambenek wrote:
>> Count me in.
>>
>> There is no reason to limit our defenses to the one thing that we
>> think is important at one instance in time... attackers change and
>> adapt and multimodal defense is simply good policy.
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 11:45 AM, Jo Rhett
>> <jrhett@netconsonance.com> wrote:
>>> On Sep 4, 2008, at 7:24 AM, James Jun wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Indeed... In today's internet, protecting your own box (cp-
>>>> policer/control
>>>> plane filtering) is far more important IMO than implementing
>>>> BCP38 when
>>>> much
>>>> of attack traffic comes from legitimate IP sources anyway (see
>>>> botnets).
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm sorry, but nonsense statements such as these burn the blood.
>>> Sure, yes,
>>> protecting yourself is so much more important than protecting
>>> anyone else.
>>>
>>> Anyone else want to stand up and join the "I am an asshole" club?
>>>
>>> --
>>> Jo Rhett
>>> Net Consonance : consonant endings by net philanthropy, open
>>> source and
>>> other randomness
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> --
> Jo Rhett
> Net Consonance : consonant endings by net philanthropy, open source
> and other randomness
>
>
>
