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Message-Id: <200109242023.f8OKNWZ02469@grosse.bisbee.fugue.com> To: Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net> Cc: Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com>, cryptography@wasabisystems.com In-Reply-To: Message from Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net> of "Mon, 24 Sep 2001 11:44:51 MST." <Pine.LNX.4.21.0109241138120.6890-100000@bolt.sonic.net> Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2001 13:23:32 -0700 From: Ted Lemon <mellon@nominum.com> > Actually, dictionary attacks reveal about sixty percent of passwords, > so for every six passwords you find on a dictionary attack, you can > infer ten actual stegotexts times the ratio between your analyzed and > discovered (possibly-false) positives. This presumes that people who use steganography in the real world right now are similar in their password security habits to the general computer user population. Steganography is an esoteric practice, and really only interesting in the real world to people who have much more serious security worries than the average computer user. So I think this is actually unrealistic - I would bet that close to 0% of encryption keys used to encrypt data sent in the real world using steganography (assuming steganography is being used by anybody but crypto researchers right now) would be susceptible to dictionary attack. _MelloN_ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com
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