[7951] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Rijndael & Hitachi
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Wed Oct 11 23:37:26 2000
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
Cc: Michael Paul Johnson <mpj@ebible.org>,
"Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>,
Vin McLellan <vin@shore.net>, coderpunks@toad.com, cryptography@c2.net,
cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 11 Oct 2000 11:38:27 -0400
In-Reply-To: "Steven M. Bellovin"'s message of "Wed, 11 Oct 2000 10:25:21 -0400"
Message-ID: <sjm4s2jjslo.fsf@indiana.mit.edu>
"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com> writes:
> Precisely. What is the *real* threat model?
>
> History does indeed show that believed-secure ciphers may not be, and
> that we do indeed need a safety margin. But history shows even more
> strongly that there are many better ways to the plaintext, and that's
> the real goal.
Why try to pick a Medeco when it's locking a glass door? :-)
-derek
PS: This isn't a hypothetical; I visited a friend's parents a number
of years ago, and noticed that their front door, all glass (with
nothing behind it) was locked using a Medeco lock. For those who
don't know, a Medeco is a top-of-the-line lock, practically impossible
to pick, drill out, etc.
--
Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/ PP-ASEL-IA N1NWH
warlord@MIT.EDU PGP key available
