[7949] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (David Jablon)
Wed Oct 11 10:37:59 2000
Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20001011102830.008707c0@world.std.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2000 10:28:30 -0400
To: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
From: David Jablon <dpj@world.std.com>
Cc: dcsb@ai.mit.edu, cryptography@c2.net, cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
In-Reply-To: <v04210100b60981c6f21c@[24.218.56.92]>
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"Anti-repudiation" sounds good to me.
... even if does remind me of "antidisestablishmentarianism".
Come to think of it, now even that term sounds appropriate here -- as
our belief in the value of methods that deter key "dis-establishment".
Pretty scary.
-- dpj
At 09:08 AM 10/11/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
>My concern is that the vast majority of informed lay people, lawyers,
>judges, legislators, etc. will hear "non-repudiation" and hear
>"absolute proof." If you doubt this, read the breathless articles
>written recently about the new U.S. Electronic Signatures Act.
>
>I don't think technologists should be free to use evocative terms and
>then define away their common sense meaning in the fine print.
>Certainly a valid public key signature is strong evidence and
>services like that described in the draft can be useful. I simply
>object to calling them "non-repudiation services." I would not object
>to "anti-repudiation services," "counter-repudiation services" or
>"repudiation-resistant technology." Would the banking industry employ
>terms like "forgery-proof checks," "impregnable vaults" or
>"pick-proof locks" to describe conventional security measures that
>were known to be fallible?
