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Re: Oh for a decently encrypted mobile phone...

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Fri Sep 15 19:42:18 2000

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Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2000 16:11:51 -0400
To: Bram Cohen <bram@gawth.com>,
        Enzo Michelangeli <enzo.michelangeli@firstecom.com>
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
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At 10:08 PM -0700 9/13/2000, Bram Cohen wrote:
>On Thu, 14 Sep 2000, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
>
>> http://www.the-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2000/09/10/stinwenws01007.html
>>
>> SOLDIERS are having to use insecure mobile phones to communicate in
>> battlefield exercises because, they say, the army's radio
>> communications system is so unreliable. Senior commanders be-lieve
>> that the reliability of mobile phones outweighs the increased risk of
>> conversations being intercepted.

It is interesting to note that scanners capable of monitoring cell 
phone traffic are illegal in the US, making it hard for the Red team 
to go out and buy a unit at Radio Shack and use it to monitor the 
Black team's cell phone traffic.  Such scanners are available 
overseas, at least for analog cell phones, so potential adversaries 
could get them. Of course, most US cell phones won't work in the rest 
of the world anyway.


>
>Wouldn't it be ironic if they resort to buying a bunch of stariums ...
>
>
>-Bram Cohen
>
>[That would require that Stariums actually appear on the market at
>some point. --Perry]


A less ambitious project than Starium might be a line of cell phones 
with symmetric encryption.  You could load the key the same way you 
store speed-dial numbers.  Three 10-digt numbers would be more than 
enough.  Several keys could easily be stored.  Such phones would 
allow small groups to communicate in total secrecy with no additional 
infrastructure.


Arnold Reinhold

Arnold Reinhold


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