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Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Fri Feb 11 16:59:33 2000

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Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 16:46:04 -0500
To: daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner), cryptography@c2.net
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
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At 12:38 PM -0800 2/11/2000, David Wagner wrote:
>In article <v04210102b4ca1b7a641f@[24.218.56.92]>,
>Arnold G. Reinhold <reinhold@world.std.com> wrote:
>> Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a
>> higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by
> > law enforcement agencies.
>
>Law enforcement friendly is very different from SIGINT friendly.

I agree completely. That is why I copied the Capstone abstract 
verbatim. Peter Gutmann had written:

>it's described in the abstract as "a SIGINT friendly replacement for DES"

What the abstract actually says is: "CAPSTONE started as an 
embodiment of a Law Enforcement SIGINT friendly replacement for the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES)."

"SIGINT friendly" might suggest an NSA back door. "Law Enforcement 
SIGINT friendly" doesn't imply anything more than what was originally 
advertised. I assume Peter was just careless in his quoting, but it 
is an important distinction.

Arnold Reinhold


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