[6612] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Interesting point about the declassified Capstone spec
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (habs@panix.com)
Fri Feb 11 16:52:05 2000
From: habs@panix.com
Message-Id: <200002112137.QAA06703@panix3.panix.com>
To: reinhold@world.std.com (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 16:37:22 -0500 (EST)
Cc: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, cryptography@c2.net
In-Reply-To: <v04210102b4ca1b7a641f@[24.218.56.92]> from "Arnold G. Reinhold" at Feb 11, 2000 03:25:45 PM
Reply-To: habs@panix.com
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
I've always thought that the unique id built into each device and
available to Law Enforcement (LE) without court order would give LE
huge leap forward in traffic analyses.
In other-words, all the digital messages from various capstone devices
could work their way around the world and LE would have a digitally
signed ID that they can use to tell who is talking to who. IHMO, that
is often more important then knowing what is in the message.
> "(U) CAPSTONE started as an embodiment of a Law Enforcement SIGINT
> friendly replacement for the Data Encryption Standard (DES). This
> requirement would offer greater security than DES while permitting
