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X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) To: cryptography@metzdowd.com, eugen@leitl.org, pfarrell@pfarrell.com In-Reply-To: <20050910205530.GU2249@leitl.org> Date: Sun, 11 Sep 2005 22:53:34 +1200 Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org> writes: >On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 06:08:25PM -0400, Pat Farrell wrote: >> Something tells me that soon is not gonna happen in what I would >> call soon. Smartcards (the smart part) were moderately interesting >> when there was no networking. We've been at ubiquitous networking >> for many years. > >We also have ubiquitous networking of systems which are vulnerable and >frequently compromised. Smartcard + reader is a hardened cryptographic >compartment where you can still trust what you see on the reader display, and >that nobody can sniff what is entered on the keypad. > >Such a system can be safely connected to an insecure, networked machine. The problem with this is that in 99.99% of cases the insecure networked machine *is* the reader, rendering the smart card pretty much pointless. I've only ever seen a handful of card readers that have keypads and displays, and none that have succeeded commercially. Everyone just gets the cheap reader- only devices. Peter. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
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