[145475] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perry E. Metzger)
Wed Jul 28 13:25:39 2010
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2010 13:25:21 -0400
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
To: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20100728162051.GW566@oracle.com>
On Wed, 28 Jul 2010 11:20:52 -0500 Nicolas Williams
<Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 12:18:56PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> > Again, I understand that in a technological sense, in an ideal
> > world, they would be equivalent. However, the big difference,
> > again, is that you can't run Kerberos with no KDC, but you can
> > run a PKI without an OCSP server. The KDC is impossible to leave
> > out of the system. That is a really nice technological feature.
>
> Whether PKI can run w/o OCSP is up to the relying parties. Today,
> because OCSP is an afterthought, they have little choice.
My mother relies on many certificates. Can she make a decision on
whether or not her browser uses OCSP for all its transactions?
I mention this only because your language here is quite sticky.
Saying it is "up to the relying parties" is incorrect. It is really
up to a host of people who are nowhere near the relying parties. In
most cases, the relying parties aren't even capable of understanding
the issue.
Perry
--
Perry E. Metzger perry@piermont.com
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