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Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2010 22:34:26 +0100 From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> CC: cryptography@metzdowd.com In-Reply-To: <E1OciwU-0000af-Sm@wintermute02.cs.auckland.ac.nz> On 24/07/2010 18:55, Peter Gutmann wrote: > - PKI dogma doesn't even consider availability issues but expects the > straightforward execution of the condition "problem -> revoke cert". For a > situation like this, particularly if the cert was used to sign 64-bit > drivers, I wouldn't have revoked because the global damage caused by that is > potentially much larger than the relatively small-scale damage caused by the > malware. So alongside "too big to fail" we now have "too widely-used to > revoke". Is anyone running x64 Windows with revocation checking enabled and > drivers signed by the Realtek or JMicron certs? One way to mitigate this would be to revoke a cert on a date, and only reject signatures on files you received after that date. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.links.org/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
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