[12631] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Scientists question electronic voting
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ian Brown)
Thu Mar 6 09:57:27 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@wasabisystems.com
From: Ian Brown <I.Brown@cs.ucl.ac.uk>
To: 'Ed Gerck' <egerck@nma.com>,
cryptography <cryptography@wasabisystems.com>
Cc: Rebecca Mercuri <notable@mindspring.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2003 02:39:42 -0000
In-Reply-To: <3E63FF95.708674AF@nma.com>
Ed Gerck wrote:
> Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal
> that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic
> voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to
> solve than the silent subversion of e-records.
>
> For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by
> using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera,
> obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the
> vote, or keep the job. And no one would know or be able to trace it.
As a voter could record what they did with pencil-and-paper or a
mechanical voting machine.
The partial defence in all three systems is that the voter should be
able to void the vote after photographing a "receipt" to hand over later
to the vote-buyer, and then cast a real vote. In the UK, for example,
you can obtain a new ballot paper from a polling station official in
exchange for a "spoiled" one. I believe Rebecca Mercuri has always
suggested that a voter should be able to confirm whether a receipt
printed by an electronic voting machine correctly records their intended
vote, and if not to void it.
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