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[linux-alert] Yet Another Java Hole.

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jeff Uphoff)
Thu May 2 14:46:59 1996

Date: Thu, 2 May 1996 12:50:11 -0400
From: Jeff Uphoff <juphoff@tarsier.cv.nrao.edu>
To: linux-alert@tarsier.cv.nrao.edu, linux-security@tarsier.cv.nrao.edu
Reply-To: linux-security@tarsier.cv.nrao.edu

Not Linux-specific, but there are enough Linuxers running Web browsers
to make this a potential threat to a large number of Linux systems.

--Up.

------- start of forwarded message (RFC 934 encapsulation) -------
Excerpted from RISKS 18.08.
- ------------

Date: Sun, 28 Apr 1996 03:42:49 +0000 (BST)
>From: David Hopwood <david.hopwood@lady-margaret-hall.oxford.ac.uk>
Subject: Another way to run native code from Java applets
 
In addition to the security bug found by Drew Dean, Ed Felten and Dan
Wallach in March, there is another way to run native code from a Java
applet, which will require a separate fix to the current versions of
Netscape (2.01 and Atlas PR2) and Sun's Java Development Kit (1.01).
 
Both this attack and the previous one rely on an applet being able to create
an instance of the same security-sensitive class, but each does so using an
independent hole in the bytecode verifier.
 
Once an applet is able to run native code, it can read, write, and execute
any local file, with the permissions of the browser.  These attacks do not
require any additional preconditions, other than viewing the attacker's web
page with Java enabled.  They can be done without the user's knowledge.
 
Summary of Java bugs found so far
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Date      Found by  Fixed in   Effects
- ---------  ------  ----------  -------
Oct 30 95  DFW     not fixed   Various - see
                   in HotJava  ftp://ftp.cs.princeton.edu/reports/1995/501.ps.Z
Feb 18 96  DFW/SG  1.01/2.01   Applets can exploit DNS spoofing to 
                               connect to machines behind firewalls
                               Buffer overflow bug in javap
Mar  2 96  DH      1.01/2.01   win32/MacOS: Applets can run native code
                               UNIX:        Ditto, provided certain files can
                                            be created on the client
Mar 22 96  DFW     not fixed   Applets can run native code
Mar 22 96  EW      not fixed   If host names are unregistered, applets may be
                               able to connect to them
Apr 27 96  DH      not fixed   Applets can run native code
 
There was also a separate bug in beta versions of Netscape 2.0 which, in 
hindsight, would have allowed applets to run native code.
 
[DFW = Drew Dean, Ed Felten, Dan Wallach
       http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/News.html
 SG =  Steve Gibbons
       http://www.aztech.net/~steve/java/
 DH =  David Hopwood
       http://ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk/~david/java/
 EW =  Eric Williams
       http://www.sky.net/~williams/java/javasec.html
 
 Dates indicate when the problem was first posted to RISKS, except for
 Eric Williams' bug, which has not been posted.]
 
For bugs in Javascript, see John LoVerso's page
  http://www.osf.org/~loverso/javascript/
These include the ability to list any local directory (apparently fixed
in Atlas PR2), and a new version of the real-time history tracker.
 
Additional information on the March 2nd absolute pathname bug is now
available from 
  http://ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk/~david/java/
 
Recommended actions
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Netscape (2.0beta*, 2.0, 2.01):
  Disable Java (on all platforms except Windows 3.1x), and if possible
  Javascript, using the Security Preferences dialogue in the Options menu.
  Note that the section on security in the Netscape release notes is not
  up-to-date.
 
Netscape (Atlas PR1, PR2):
  As above, except that the options to disable Java and Javascript have 
  moved to the Languages tab in the Network Preferences dialogue.
 
Appletviewer (JDK beta*, 1.0, 1.01):
  Do not use appletviewer to load applets from untrusted hosts.
 
HotJava (alpha*):
  Sun no longer supports HotJava alpha, and does not not intend to fix
  any of its security holes until a beta version is released.
 
David Hopwood  david.hopwood@lmh.ox.ac.uk
------- end -------

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