[41703] in Cypherpunks
Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Futplex)
Wed Oct 18 12:20:04 1995
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 1995 12:13:18 -0400 (EDT)
Reply-To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.3.89.9510180431.A22347-0100000@netcom4> from "Modemac" at Oct 18, 95 04:58:33 am
From: futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex)
Modemac writes:
> The basic idea for this system goes like this:
>
> 1) A person writes a message and encrypts it with PGP.
> 2) That person then posts his message to the "anonymous messages"
> newsgroup.
> 3) A remailer scanning the newsgroup picks up the message,
> decrypts it, strips the headers and makes it anonymous, and
> sends it to its destination.
Just for the record, I'll note this is a fairly old idea (cf. the
Cyphernomicon, news:alt.anonymous, news:alt.anonymous.messages, etc.)
[...]
> A "token" (like the token ring of IBM fame) would be passed back and
> forth between all of the Cryptoclients in the remailer network, so
> that only one remailer would be "active" at any given time. This
> token would be passed back and forth at random, so no one would know
> exactly which remailer is being used to anonymize a message.
I don't see how this is possible given widespread RFC 822 compliance.
Any given message must be sent from some particular address. I see two
main options:
(1) The remailed-message is sent as a single message from a single remailer.
That remailer is subject to various sorts of pressure if the remailed-
message offends its recipient.
(2) The remailed-message is sent as several messages from several remailers.
The recipient's MDA reassembles the fragments into the remailed-message.
Any or all of those remailers are subject to pressure if the remailed-
message offends the recipient.
Either way, at least one remailer is subject to pressure for sending a
specific piece of email.
(If the token is passed around randomly, then it might be more difficult for
an adversary to predict which remailer will send the _next_ message. However,
adversaries such as Cof$ are interested in assailing remailers that have
_already_ sent messages, due to the content of those messages. They can tell
which remailer sent _past_ messages, which is what they need.)
-Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>
