[109637] in Cypherpunks
Re:
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (dana@dtn.com)
Wed Mar 31 10:57:23 1999
From: dana@dtn.com
To: Mixmaster <mixmaster@remail.obscura.com>
cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 09:24:49 -0600
Reply-To: dana@dtn.com
Maybe it's me, but this is a horrible idea.
It would be useless to both the users (Who would have a x% chance of being
decrypted) and to law enforcement (Who only have an x%chance to catch the
"Important" call.(I am expecting that even criminals usual phone call is not
about crime.)).
Dan Anderson
Mixmaster <mixmaster@remail.obscura.com> on 03/30/99 08:18:03 PM
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
cc: (bcc: Dan Anderson/ENG)
Subject:
Monday, March 29, 1999 - 17:51:54 MET
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00145/bibs/12n2p117.html
Translucent Cryptography - An Alternative to Key Escrow, and Its Implementation
via Fractional Oblivious
Transfer
Mihir Bellare, Ronald L. Rivest
Translucent Cryptography - An Alternative to Key Escrow, and Its Implementation
via Fractional Oblivious
Transfer
Mihir Bellare, Ronald L. Rivest
Subscribers may view full text in PDF from web page
Abstract
We present an alternative to the controversial ``key-escrow'' techniques
for enabling law enforcement and national security access to encrypted
communications. Our proposal allows such access with probability p for
each message, for a parameter p between 0 and 1 to be chosen (say, by
Congress) to provide an appropriate balance between concerns for
individual privacy, on the one hand, and the need for such access by law
enforcement and national security, on the other. (For example, with
p=0.4 , a law-enforcement agency conducting an authorized wiretap which
records 100 encrypted conversations would expect to be able to decrypt
(approximately) 40 of these conversations; the agency would not be able to
decrypt the remaining 60 conversations at all.) Our scheme is remarkably
simple to implement, as it requires no prior escrowing of keys.
Original Recipient: DANA.MHS @ DTN
