[176620] in North American Network Operators' Group
Re: ARIN's RPKI Relying agreement
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Alex Band)
Sat Dec 6 03:28:05 2014
X-Original-To: nanog@nanog.org
From: Alex Band <alexb@ripe.net>
In-Reply-To: <5481E4B3.6010607@foobar.org>
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2014 09:27:52 +0100
To: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
Cc: John Curran <jcurran@arin.net>,
North American Network Operators' Group <nanog@nanog.org>
Errors-To: nanog-bounces@nanog.org
> On 5 Dec 2014, at 18:00, Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> wrote:
>=20
> On 05/12/2014 11:47, Randy Bush wrote:
>>>> and the difference is?
>>> rpki might work at scale.
>>=20
>> ohhh noooooooooo!
>=20
> So if e.g. ARIN went offline or signed some broken
> data which caused Joe's Basement ISP in Lawyerville to go offline =
globally,
> you can probably see why ARIN would want to limit its liability.
If ARIN (or another other RIR) went offline or signed broken data, all =
signed prefixes that previously has the RPKI status "Valid", would fall =
back to the state "Unknown", as if they were never signed in the first =
place. The state would NOT be "Invalid".=20
What is the likelihood of Joe's Basement ISP being filtered by anyone =
because their BGP announcements are RPKI "Unknown", as if they weren't =
participating in the opt-in system?=20
It seems as if the argumentation is built around "RIR messes up =3D=3D =
ISPs go offline", but that isn't a realistic scenario IMO, because no =
operator in their right mind would drop prefixes with the state =
"Unknown". You could only realistically do that if all 550,000 =
Announcements in the DFZ are covered by a ROA. Not soon, if ever.
-Alex=
