[16591] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Adam Back)
Tue Jan 4 14:54:23 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 16:47:55 -0500
From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Taral <taral@taral.net>
Cc: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>, cryptography@metzdowd.com,
Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
In-Reply-To: <20041222192459.GA28402@yzma.clarkk.net>
>From what I recall from reading the CR paper a while back they can
tolerate up to some threshold of colluding players. However if you go
over that threshold (and it's not too large) you can remove the mark.
I would think the simplest canonical counter-attack would be to make a
p2p app that compares diffs in the binary output (efficiently rsync
style) accumulates enough bits to strip the disk watermark, p2p rips
and publishes. QED.
DRM is a misguided endeavor. You can not simultaneously give people
digital content and expect to stop them digitally copying it. The
"attacker" owns and paid for the player.
Adam
On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 01:24:59PM -0600, Taral wrote:
> Is there really that much space for marking? Any substantial number of
> marked bits will become obvious in the output stream, no?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
