[23832] in Perl-Users-Digest
Perl-Users Digest, Issue: 6035 Volume: 10
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perl-Users Digest)
Thu Jan 29 21:41:48 2004
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2004 18:36:06 -0800 (PST)
From: Perl-Users Digest <Perl-Users-Request@ruby.OCE.ORST.EDU>
To: Perl-Users@ruby.OCE.ORST.EDU (Perl-Users Digest)
Perl-Users Digest Thu, 29 Jan 2004 Volume: 10 Number: 6035
Today's topics:
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need (Mark Jason Dominus)
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need (Walter Roberson)
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need <zentara@highstream.net>
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need (Walter Roberson)
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need <tadmc@augustmail.com>
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need (Walter Roberson)
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need <zentara@highstream.net>
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need (Walter Roberson)
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need <zentara@highstream.net>
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need <zentara@highstream.net>
Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need <peter@semantico.com>
Digest Administrivia (Last modified: 6 Apr 01) (Perl-Users-Digest Admin)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2004 22:13:27 +0000 (UTC)
From: mjd@plover.com (Mark Jason Dominus)
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <buhkq7$4r3$1@plover.com>
In article <norovvsvfko2eppmecebt42bm61kfs2pii@4ax.com>,
Henry Law <news@lawshouse.org> wrote:
>In the UK there is no anonymity in our parliamentary and local voting
>systems. When you pitch up to the polling booth the attendant takes
>your name and writes your voter number on the counterfoil from which
>she tears the voting slip; they are both numbered. So when you've
>made your cross there is a direct tie-up between your voting paper and
>your voter number, and therefore to you. Is "appalling" the word I
>want?
I'm startled, but I won't be appalled until I hear that the UK has
problems of the type that the anonymity is there to avoid.
If there is a way to match up a person with their votes, then it
becomes possible, at least in principle to force the voter to vote a
particular way through extortion, blackmail, or bribery. With
anonymous voting, these schemes don't work, because there is no way to
verify afterward that the coercion was successful.
But if such coercion never occurs in the UK, then I suppose there's no
problem to solve.
In the better sorts of electronic voting systems in the U.S., the
voting machine produces a receipt listing that candidates for whom the
coter has voted; the voter can then verify that the machine has the
correct ballot before leaving the polling station. But the receipt is
confiscated and destroyed before the voter leaves, to avoid the
possibility of vote selling.
------------------------------
Date: 22 Jan 2004 00:39:15 GMT
From: roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca (Walter Roberson)
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <bun63j$tr$1@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca>
In article <a3us00dqpq58h98t5mi6tm07qglqhrr7s2@4ax.com>,
zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
:Ok, so you don't like SSN numbers, that was just off the top of head.
Yikes, that's exactly the problem: there are a *lot* of ways to do
this incorrectly, and most people don't think about the issues and just
assume it is easy and something that can be done over a weekend.
:Now you have a system which the voter can check his vote was properly
:recorded, by going to the online database, entering the sha2-hash, and
:get his vote record.
But you still have no proof that your vote was counted correctly.
Unless literally *every* vote was registered as being for a different
candidate so you *know* something is wrong, there is always the possibility
that your favorite candidate was really unpopular and you were one of the
few people who voted for him or her.
You don't want the primary counting system to be electronic. You want
the primary counting system to be based upon hard, recountable evidence,
and you want the counting system to be as foolproof as you can get --
mechanical if you can make it reliable. Counting systems that take
electronic talleys are susceptable to corruption in the counting logic.
There has been suggestion that something like that happened in a recent
California vote: see Craig DeForest's posting in Risks Digest 22.95
http://groups.google.ca/groups?selm=CMM.0.90.4.1065824799.risko%40chiron.csl.sri.com
The link there to markcrispinmiller's blog makes for interesting reading;
even if the events claimed there did not occur, there are lessons to be
learned about what kind of events must be clearly impossible in a well-
run voting system.
:Plus paper recounts take too long, as we have
:seen in the Florida debacle.
Not true. Canada and the UK both work by counting paper ballots, and
the results are generally available within hours, not weeks. It is
true that Canada's population is only about 1/8th the population of
the USA, but the procedures used are parallelized.
:Another plus to this system is you can do it all with cheap PCs with
:touchscreens and expanded usb ports.
Sigh. It doesn't work that simply. It's when the "cheap PCs with
touchscreens" are introduced that the problems start becoming most
apparent.
--
I've been working on a kernel
All the livelong night.
I've been working on a kernel
And it still won't work quite right. -- J. Benson & J. Doll
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2004 09:11:01 -0500
From: zentara <zentara@highstream.net>
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <pcmv00todrdp2dln2kaon8f2irammki6tf@4ax.com>
On 22 Jan 2004 00:39:15 GMT, roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca (Walter
Roberson) wrote:
>In article <a3us00dqpq58h98t5mi6tm07qglqhrr7s2@4ax.com>,
>zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
>
>:Ok, so you don't like SSN numbers, that was just off the top of head.
>
>Yikes, that's exactly the problem: there are a *lot* of ways to do
>this incorrectly, and most people don't think about the issues and just
>assume it is easy and something that can be done over a weekend.
Yeah, you are right. It would take a team of top Perl programmers,
(I'm not one), brainstorming for a few weeks, and testing prototypes.
As far as needing a hard copy vote record, as opposed to an
electronic one, I don't see much of a difference. At some point
security of the data has to be maintained and assured, whether
it's boxes of paper ballots, or a hard drive full of encrypted data.
In Florida, they lost boxes of ballots, because the courier forgot
to put them in the van. A harddrive is easier to keep track of.
In the case of it being harddrive data, precautions have to be taken
that the database isn't tampered with:
--- ensure physical security
---no network connection
---keep a log of all processes
--- take a sha2sum of the database right at the poll closing
and make that public knowledge
--- use raid with reliable scsi harddrives for redundency
---use new drives for each election, and burn them in and
stress test them for a week before the election.
--- a trusted bonded programmer would have to check
the script before starting the process, and would have
to do it again anytime the voting script needed to be
restarted.
Any voting method will have it's weak points and it's strong points,
but it should come down to cost and reliability. PC's with touchscreens
would be the cheapest. You wouldn't have to have the usb keys,
you could just print out a voter receipt with their sha2 hash id for
that election. But a 1 meg usb key could probably be made for
a quarter, less than a postage stamp.
I don't see what you say is wrong with touchscreens, you could have
the program pop up a question "which dork to you vote for?", and
show a bunch of thumbnails with names to choose from. Upon selection,
a full screen photo and name is displayed, to get a confirmation or
cancel from the voter. And even a double "are you really,really sure?"
Oh well, that's about how I would do it. Like the subject asked, I
gave my ideas....if they didn't want to do it on computers, why did they
ask about how Perl could do it? The subject line presumes a computer
method, not a "dead tree" method.
--
When life conspires against you, and no longer floats your boat,
Don't waste your time with crying, just get on your back and float.
------------------------------
Date: 23 Jan 2004 03:11:47 GMT
From: roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca (Walter Roberson)
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <buq3dj$at6$1@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca>
In article <pcmv00todrdp2dln2kaon8f2irammki6tf@4ax.com>,
zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
:Oh well, that's about how I would do it. Like the subject asked, I
:gave my ideas....if they didn't want to do it on computers, why did they
:ask about how Perl could do it? The subject line presumes a computer
:method, not a "dead tree" method.
Excellent, I was hoping you would feel that way. You see, we have this
optimization problem we could use some help with. We have many thousand
of these... well, animals, really... all over the country, that need
to be eliminated, and we could use some help building a Perl-based
just-in-time delivery system to get the necessary chemicals there...
--
Whose posting was this .signature Google'd from?
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2004 21:42:19 -0600
From: Tad McClellan <tadmc@augustmail.com>
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <slrnc1160r.bim.tadmc@magna.augustmail.com>
Walter Roberson <roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca> wrote:
> In article <pcmv00todrdp2dln2kaon8f2irammki6tf@4ax.com>,
> zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
>:Oh well, that's about how I would do it. Like the subject asked, I
>:gave my ideas....if they didn't want to do it on computers, why did they
>:ask about how Perl could do it? The subject line presumes a computer
>:method, not a "dead tree" method.
>
> Excellent, I was hoping you would feel that way. You see, we have this
> optimization problem we could use some help with. We have many thousand
> of these... well, animals, really... all over the country, that need
> to be eliminated, and we could use some help building a Perl-based
> just-in-time delivery system to get the necessary chemicals there...
Perhaps you could rework the payload on these:
"Perl and Nuclear Weapons Don't Mix"
http://www.thinkingsecure.com/docs/tpj/issues/vol2_1/tpj0201-0004.html
--
Tad McClellan SGML consulting
tadmc@augustmail.com Perl programming
Fort Worth, Texas
------------------------------
Date: 23 Jan 2004 03:56:02 GMT
From: roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca (Walter Roberson)
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <buq60i$c23$1@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca>
In article <pcmv00todrdp2dln2kaon8f2irammki6tf@4ax.com>,
zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
:Oh well, that's about how I would do it. Like the subject asked, I
:gave my ideas....if they didn't want to do it on computers, why did they
:ask about how Perl could do it? The subject line presumes a computer
:method, not a "dead tree" method.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/23/opinion/23FRI1.html?ex=1075438800&en=5ef47cf7a6a658cc&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE
The Perils of Online Voting
[...]
Four computer scientists brought in by the Pentagon to analyze a
plan for Internet voting by the military issued a blistering report
this week, concluding that the program should be halted.
[...]
The report makes it clear that the possibilities for compromising the
secrecy of the ballot, voting multiple times and carrying out vote
theft on a large scale are limited only by the imagination and skill of
would-be saboteurs. Viruses can be written that will lodge on voters'
computers and change their votes. Internet service providers, or even
foreign governments that control network access, can interfere with
votes before they reach their destination.
--
"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics."
-- not Twain, perhaps Disraeli, first quoted by Leonard Courtney
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2004 08:13:21 -0500
From: zentara <zentara@highstream.net>
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <o77210d56hk4a58bc76efbam1vga9iup0d@4ax.com>
On 23 Jan 2004 03:56:02 GMT, roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca (Walter
Roberson) wrote:
>In article <pcmv00todrdp2dln2kaon8f2irammki6tf@4ax.com>,
>zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
>:Oh well, that's about how I would do it. Like the subject asked, I
>:gave my ideas....if they didn't want to do it on computers, why did they
>:ask about how Perl could do it? The subject line presumes a computer
>:method, not a "dead tree" method.
>
>http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/23/opinion/23FRI1.html?ex=1075438800&en=5ef47cf7a6a658cc&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE
>
>The Perils of Online Voting
>
>[...]
>Four computer scientists brought in by the Pentagon to analyze a
>plan for Internet voting by the military issued a blistering report
>this week, concluding that the program should be halted.
The plan I suggested was not "internet voting", it was for using
cheap computers for local precinct voting, with verification
from the internet. That would be the first step to take.
>[...]
>The report makes it clear that the possibilities for compromising the
>secrecy of the ballot, voting multiple times and carrying out vote
>theft on a large scale are limited only by the imagination and skill of
>would-be saboteurs. Viruses can be written that will lodge on voters'
>computers and change their votes. Internet service providers, or even
>foreign governments that control network access, can interfere with
>votes before they reach their destination.
They have to get rid of Windows. :-)
As Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson said: "Microsoft Windows represents
a threat to the security of the US internet"(paraphrased from memory)
--
When life conspires against you, and no longer floats your boat,
Don't waste your time with crying, just get on your back and float.
------------------------------
Date: 23 Jan 2004 17:59:44 GMT
From: roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca (Walter Roberson)
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <burneg$2ii$1@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca>
In article <o77210d56hk4a58bc76efbam1vga9iup0d@4ax.com>,
zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
:The plan I suggested was not "internet voting", it was for using
:cheap computers for local precinct voting, with verification
:from the internet. That would be the first step to take.
And your plan was immune from the sorts of problems they mentioned?
Did your plan not call for the ability of voters to check their
votes by using their home PCs (which might have viruses/ trojans)
to check via the Internet (where their ISP might interfere) the
registry? Did your plan not call for the user having pre-initialized
their usb key ring? How was that to be done, on stand-alone kiosks
whereever lottery tickets are sold (and how do you know those
aren't compromised?), or on the user's computer (and how do you
know that a virus isn't lying about what's on the keyring)?
Any time you have a record which is primarily held in electronic
form, you need an intermediary process to interpret the record for
you, and that intermediary process is open to attack. If you
have instead a record in which the primary version is human-readable,
then humans can -directly- verify the record; then you just have to
worry about the counting procedures.
Besides... the big pushes from States towards electronic balloting
have to do with the perception that the reason for low voter turnouts
is that voting in person is too inconvenient. If you want to
successfully introduce a new voting system, then you had better be
prepared to handle Internet voting (or voting by phone) -- or to
be able to argue persuasively (using small words and short arguments)
that those are really bad ideas but that your implimentation does not
suffer from any of the same flaws.
:They have to get rid of Windows. :-)
And replace it with which OS? Linux is not exactly respected for its
security. Besides, in context, you are talking about getting rid of
Windows at the consumer desktop level. The only way that is likely
to happen on a useful timescale would be by legislative fiat --
and I'm sure that Microsoft would be easily able to win the court
cases that ensued, on the basis that it would be totally unreasonable
to ban a product on the basis that it doesn't do something it wasn't
designed to do, never claimed to do, for which there are no standards
for, which is optional for any person to do, and which is only
done every couple of years by any one person.
--
Strange but true: there are entire WWW pages devoted to listing
programs designed to obfuscate HTML.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2004 07:48:23 -0500
From: zentara <zentara@highstream.net>
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <v1q410tef78tpmrc2imskr5tt529jg5phj@4ax.com>
On 23 Jan 2004 17:59:44 GMT, roberson@ibd.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca (Walter
Roberson) wrote:
>In article <o77210d56hk4a58bc76efbam1vga9iup0d@4ax.com>,
>zentara <zentara@highstream.net> wrote:
>:The plan I suggested was not "internet voting", it was for using
>:cheap computers for local precinct voting, with verification
>:from the internet. That would be the first step to take.
>
>And your plan was immune from the sorts of problems they mentioned?
>Did your plan not call for the ability of voters to check their
>votes by using their home PCs (which might have viruses/ trojans)
>to check via the Internet (where their ISP might interfere) the
>registry?
All you need to do is make a 'copy' available for checking, with it's
sha2sum posted and matching the original. Of course we have
to trust the people who hold the originals. Any voting system involves
you putting trust in the administator of the vote, unless it's an "open
show of hands" type of vote.
>Did your plan not call for the user having pre-initialized
>their usb key ring? How was that to be done, on stand-alone kiosks
>whereever lottery tickets are sold (and how do you know those
>aren't compromised?), or on the user's computer (and how do you
>know that a virus isn't lying about what's on the keyring)?
First of all, don't attack my system, because of Window's virrii.
I use linux or some other unix variant which is immune to what you
are talking about. USB keys can be made secure. You could
have your keys pre-initialized with a key-pair, or have one generated
at the voting machine. The program would have to address those security
issues, testing their validity, their filemodes, etc.
>
>Any time you have a record which is primarily held in electronic
>form, you need an intermediary process to interpret the record for
>you, and that intermediary process is open to attack. If you
>have instead a record in which the primary version is human-readable,
>then humans can -directly- verify the record; then you just have to
>worry about the counting procedures.
Well sure, if you have an electronic form and processing, abuse is
possible. If the vote administrator is taking bribes, and allows
outside sources to manipulate the ballots, you have a flawed election.
This can be prevented with logging all processes, a security videotape
of the the database machine, showing all access, until the harddrives
are removed and sealed. Giving the multiple harddrives, each with
matching sha2sums to different couriers, for transport to the main
processing center. A "safety internet transfer" of a encrypted copy
of the harddrives sent, in case all or one of the couriers is
comprimised.
It's the same with paper ballots, as a matter of fact it's even easier
to manipulate them. What's to stop the administrator or courier from
taking half a box of paper ballots, burning them, and replacing them
with some bogus ballots?
At least with electronic vote records, with sha2-summed redundancy,
you will be able to detect post-election changes.
So what would happen if 2 of the courier sha2sums don't match?
Well then, some sort of "recount procedure" would have to be
established. First doing a binary diff on all copies. If only 1 or 2
bits have changed (due to innocent cosmic rays or EMfields),
the original vote can be be deduced. If the entire vote has changed,
then a re-examination of the votes have to be made. This would probably
be something like this:
---- when the private keys are saved to the database, they go directly
onto an encrypted partition, which has a password known only to
the administrator and in a sealed court document held by a
trusted person.
--- when the recount is ordered, they open the secret keys and decrypted
all the pgp encrypted ballots and do the recount.
---if it shows that votes have been changed between the redundant
raid copies, then the individual voter is contacted and asked to
show his receipt, either the usb key, and/or a hard copy printout
of the ascii-armored keys, and encrypted ballot.
You can see it would be very hard to change votes.
Additionally, if a voter checks his vote online, and it dosn't match his
receipt, he could demand an investigation, which could lead to a
recount. The first thing to check is that the "online copy" is still
valid, if not, assume the web site was comprimised, and repost
another valid copy. Those sites could aslo run cron scripts to
periodically check for validity.
It would take the collusion of many people to pull off an election fix
in this type of system, and sooner or later, it would be found out.
Sooner or later, people talk about their dirty deeds.
>
>Besides... the big pushes from States towards electronic balloting
>have to do with the perception that the reason for low voter turnouts
>is that voting in person is too inconvenient. If you want to
>successfully introduce a new voting system, then you had better be
>prepared to handle Internet voting (or voting by phone) -- or to
>be able to argue persuasively (using small words and short arguments)
>that those are really bad ideas but that your implimentation does not
>suffer from any of the same flaws.
One step at a time. First you have to introduce the system at the
familiar, safer precinct voting method. Then maybe by the time IPV6
is in wide use, we can work on voting over the internet.
>:They have to get rid of Windows. :-)
>
>And replace it with which OS? Linux is not exactly respected for its
>security. Besides, in context, you are talking about getting rid of
>Windows at the consumer desktop level. The only way that is likely
>to happen on a useful timescale would be by legislative fiat --
>and I'm sure that Microsoft would be easily able to win the court
>cases that ensued, on the basis that it would be totally unreasonable
>to ban a product on the basis that it doesn't do something it wasn't
>designed to do, never claimed to do, for which there are no standards
>for, which is optional for any person to do, and which is only
>done every couple of years by any one person.
If people have a virus prone computer, they should not be allowed
to use it for actually casting the vote. They can "check" their vote
with Windows with no security risk. That restriction is not illegal.
Why is it illegal to say "if your tool is dangerous, you can't use it
in an election"?
What should be illegal, is allowing Microsoft to sell their crap.
Same with people who have no computer, Windows users will have to go
to the precincts to vote.
Bill Gates may have alot of politicians in his pocket, but he dosn't
have mine.
--
When life conspires against you, and no longer floats your boat,
Don't waste your time with crying, just get on your back and float.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2004 08:22:38 -0500
From: zentara <zentara@highstream.net>
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <bgjv00d1cnjn596aiqgq96f41n23rc3ndb@4ax.com>
On Wed, 21 Jan 2004 15:16:30 +0000, Peter Hickman <peter@semantico.com>
wrote:
>zentara wrote:
>> How about this. You go into vote, insert your usb memory key with your
>> public and private pgp keys on it.
>
>This is even worse! You are risking giving your private PGP key away.
>
>> ALSO, your private key is copied and
>> saved under the generated anonymous hash name, with a link to which
>> saved vote record it pertains to.
>
>No you are deliberately giving your private key away.
No this is just a key for the election. You can have numerous keys, and
you could generate a new key for yourself each election.
Throw-away keys.
>You really haven't got a clue about the use of public and private keys
Right back at you.
--
When life conspires against you, and no longer floats your boat,
Don't waste your time with crying, just get on your back and float.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2004 15:16:30 +0000
From: Peter Hickman <peter@semantico.com>
Subject: Re: Perl Programmers, America Needs Your Help! We Need Secure Voting Machines
Message-Id: <400e97cf$0$4904$afc38c87@news.easynet.co.uk>
zentara wrote:
> How about this. You go into vote, insert your usb memory key with your
> public and private pgp keys on it.
This is even worse! You are risking giving your private PGP key away.
> ALSO, your private key is copied and
> saved under the generated anonymous hash name, with a link to which
> saved vote record it pertains to.
No you are deliberately giving your private key away.
You really haven't got a clue about the use of public and private keys
and you have missed the point entirely. You are going to use a machine
and give it access to your public and private keys - if anyone managed
to put a backdoor into the voting machine they could syphon off both and
now nothing you ever do will be safely encrypted.
Whilst you are at it why not give it your bank details, mothers maiden
name and pin number.
Also remember that as the machine has your private key it can encrypt
any vote it feels like with your own key.
------------------------------
Date: 6 Apr 2001 21:33:47 GMT (Last modified)
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------------------------------
End of Perl-Users Digest V10 Issue 6035
***************************************
