[145] in Security FYI
[Security-fyi] CERT Advisory CA-2002-24 Trojan Horse OpenSSH Distribution
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (CERT Advisory)
Fri Aug 2 09:54:07 2002
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CERT Advisory CA-2002-24 Trojan Horse OpenSSH Distribution
Original issue date: August 1, 2002
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
Overview
The CERT/CC has received confirmation that some copies of the source
code for the OpenSSH package were modified by an intruder and contain
a Trojan horse.
We strongly encourage sites which employ, redistribute, or mirror the
OpenSSH package to immediately verify the integrity of their
distribution.
I. Description
The CERT/CC has received confirmation that some copies of the source
code for the OpenSSH package have been modified by an intruder and
contain a Trojan horse. The following advisory has been released by
the OpenSSH development team
http://www.openssh.com/txt/trojan.adv
The following files were modified to include the malicious code:
openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz
openssh-3.4.tgz
openssh-3.2.2p1.tar.gz
These files appear to have been placed on the FTP server which hosts
ftp.openssh.com and ftp.openbsd.org on the 30th or 31st of July, 2002.
The OpenSSH development team replaced the Trojan horse copies with the
original, uncompromised versions at 13:00 UTC, August 1st, 2002. The
Trojan horse copy of the source code was available long enough for
copies to propagate to sites that mirror the OpenSSH site.
The Trojan horse versions of OpenSSH contain malicious code that is
run when the software is compiled. This code connects to a fixed
remote server on 6667/tcp. It can then open a shell running as the
user who compiled OpenSSH.
II. Impact
An intruder operating from (or able to impersonate) the remote address
specified in the malicious code can gain unauthorized remote access to
any host which compiled a version of OpenSSH from this Trojan horse
version of the source code. The level of access would be that of the
user who compiled the source code.
III. Solution
We encourage sites who downloaded a copy of the OpenSSH distribution
to verify the authenticity of their distribution, regardless of where
it was obtained. Furthermore, we encourage users to inspect any and
all software that may have been downloaded from the compromised site.
Note that it is not sufficient to rely on the timestamps or sizes of
the file when trying to determine whether or not you have a copy of
the Trojan horse version.
Where to get OpenSSH
The primary distribution site for OpenSSH is
http://www.openssh.com/
Sites that mirror the OpenSSH source code are encouraged to verify the
integrity of their sources.
Verify MD5 checksums
You can use the following MD5 checksums to verify the integrity of
your OpenSSH source code distribution:
Correct versions:
459c1d0262e939d6432f193c7a4ba8a8 openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz
d5a956263287e7fd261528bb1962f24c openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz.sig
39659226ff5b0d16d0290b21f67c46f2 openssh-3.4.tgz
9d3e1e31e8d6cdbfa3036cb183aa4a01 openssh-3.2.2p1.tar.gz
be4f9ed8da1735efd770dc8fa2bb808a openssh-3.2.2p1.tar.gz.sig
At least one version of the modified Trojan horse distributions was
reported to have the following checksum:
Trojan horse version:
3ac9bc346d736b4a51d676faa2a08a57 openssh-3.4p1.tar.gz
Verify PGP signature
Additionally, distributions of the portable release of OpenSSH are
distributed with detached PGP signatures. Note that the Trojan horse
versions were not signed correctly, and attempts to verify the
signatures would have failed.
As a matter of good security practice, the CERT/CC encourages users to
verify, whenever possible, the integrity of downloaded software. For
more information, see
http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2001-06.html
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.
Connectiva Linux
Conectiva Linux distributes openssh-3.4p1 as a security update. The
distributed copy is the original one and is not affected by this
trojan. The detached digital signature is always checked before
building third party packages.
MandrakeSoft
MandrakeSoft has verified that the openssh-3.4p1 sources used to
build it's latest updates (ref. MDKSA-2002:040-1) do not contain
this trojan.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Feedback can be directed to the author: Chad Dougherty.
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-24.html
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available from
our web site
http://www.cert.org/
To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your
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* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
______________________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
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_________________________________________________________________
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
August 1, 2002: Initial release
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