[261] in peace2
Missile Defense System Won't Work (Boston Globe)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Martin Voelker)
Thu May 11 17:26:00 2000
Date: Thu, 11 May 2000 17:24:04 -0400
From: Martin Voelker <mvoelker@emerald.tufts.edu>
To: peace-list@MIT.EDU
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<fontfamily><param>Geneva</param>Hey guys:
think we can "enlist" those two MIT researchers to give a talk about
this topic?
<excerpt> name: Postol, Theodore
email: postol@MIT.EDU
phone: (617) 253-8077
address: E38-620
department: Sci Tech & Society
title: Prof Of Sci Tech & National Security Policy
David Wright is at: dcwright@mit.edu
</excerpt></fontfamily><smaller><smaller>To set up interviews or get
information:
</smaller></smaller><excerpt><excerpt><fontfamily><param>Geneva</param>PAUL
FAIN
Assistant Press Secretary
202 332-0900
pfain@ucsusa.org
RICH HAYES
Media Director
202 332-0900
rhayes@ucsusa.org
</fontfamily></excerpt></excerpt><fontfamily><param>Geneva</param>
Here is the article they just published in the Globe:
Martin Voelker
snatched from http://commondreams.org
Breaking News & Views for the Progressive Community... Thursday May 11
, 2000
Published on Thursday, May 11, 2000 in the Boston Globe by David Wright
and Theodore Postol (both MIT!!)
The United States is on the verge of deploying a national missile
defense system intended to shoot down long-range missiles. The Clinton
administration is scheduled to decide this fall whether to give the
green light to a system that is expected to cost more than $60 billion,
sour relations with Russia and China, and block deep cuts in nuclear
arsenals.
But the real scandal is that the defense being developed won't work -
and few in Washington seem to know or care.
The chief difficulty in trying to develop missile defenses is not
getting vast systems of complex hardware to work as intended - although
that is a daunting task. The key problem is that the defense has to
work against an enemy who is trying to foil the system. what's worse,
the attacker can do so with technology much simpler than the technology
needed for the defense system. This inherent asymmetry means the
attacker has the advantage despite the technological edge the United
States has over a potential attacker such as North Korea.
We recently completed, along with nine other scientists, a yearlong
study that examined in detail what countermeasures an emerging missile
state could take to defeat the missile defense system the United States
is planning. That study shows that effective countermeasures require
technology much less sophisticated than is needed to build a long-range
missile in the first place - technology that would be available to the
potential attacker. This kind of analysis is possible since the United
States has already selected the interceptor and sensor technologies its
defense system would use. We assessed the full missile defense system
the United States is planning - not just the first phase planned for
2005 - and assumed only that it is constrained by the laws of physics.
We examined three countermeasures in detail, each of which would defeat
the planned US defense.
A country that decided to deliver biological weapons by ballistic
missile could divide the lethal agent into 100 or more small bombs,
known as ''bomblets,'' as a way of dispersing the agent over the
target. This would also overwhelm the defense, which couldn't shoot at
so many warheads.
The Rumsfeld panel, a high-level commission convened by Congress in
1998 to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States, noted
that potential attackers could build such bomblets. We show this in
detail.
An attacker launching missiles with nuclear weapons would have other
options. It could disguise the warhead by enclosing it in an
aluminum-coated Mylar balloon and releasing it with a large number of
empty balloons. None of the missile defense sensors could tell which
balloon held the warhead, and again the defense could not shoot at all
of them.
Alternately, we showed that the warhead could be enclosed in a thin
shroud cooled with liquid nitrogen - a common laboratory material - so
it would be invisible to the heat-seeking interceptors the defense will
use.
These are only three of many possible countermeasures. And none of
these ideas is new; most are as old as ballistic missiles themselves.
How is it possible that this problem is being ignored? The Pentagon,
saying it must walk before it can run, has divided the missile defense
problem into two parts: getting the system to work against missiles
without realistic countermeasures and then hoping to get it to work
against missiles with countermeasures. Few doubt the first step could
eventually be done, but such ''walking'' would be useless against an
actual attack by North Korea or any other country.
The second step - getting the defense to work against countermeasures -
is the one that matters. And our study showed in detail that the
planned defense won't be able to do this.
Unfortunately, the debate in Washington revolves around only the first
step. The Pentagon plans to determine the ''technological readiness''
of the system this summer after three tests that lack realistic
countermeasures. And President Clinton's decision whether to deploy
will be based on that assessment. The deployment decision is simply
being made on the wrong criteria.
This situation is similar to a group of people deciding to build a
bridge to the moon. Instead of assessing the feasibility of the full
project before moving forward, they decide to start building the
onramps, since that's the part they know how to do.
The reality is that any country that is capable of building a
long-range missile and has the motivation to launch it against the
United States would also have the capability and motivation to build
effective countermeasures to the planned defense. To assume otherwise
is to base defense planning on wishful thinking.
David Wright is a researcher at the Union of Concerned Scientists and
the MIT Security Program. Theodore Postol is professor of science,
technology, and national security at MIT. Both are physicists.
Copyright 2000 Globe Newspaper Company.
http://www.commondreams.org
</fontfamily>
Martin Voelker, news director, producer, WMFO Medford, 91.5 FM
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