[1375] in peace2
Professor Postol talk
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Julia Steinberger)
Mon Jan 14 08:58:13 2002
Message-Id: <200201141357.IAA25726@buzzword-bingo.mit.edu>
To: 17.919-iap@MIT.EDU
cc: peace-list@MIT.EDU, pugwash@MIT.EDU
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2002 08:57:56 -0500
From: Julia Steinberger <julias@MIT.EDU>
Professor Theodore Postol will be giving a guest
lecture today for 17.919. There is some space for listeners.
WHERE: 3-343
WHEN: Today, 10 AM - 12 PM.
The class schedule can be found at web.mit.edu/justice/declassifythis
Scientific Fraud in the National Missile Defense Program
The currently under development National Missile Defense System is designed
to intercept nuclear warheads at high altitudes in the near vacuum of space.
This design feature makes the defense extremely vulnerable to very simple
decoy countermeasures that need only work in the near vacuum of space. A
still more problematic feature of this defense is that its interceptors -
called homing kill vehicles - must discriminate between warheads and decoys
by analyzing the infrared signals from distant real and false targets during
a period of roughly 60 seconds from target acquisition to flyby. Not
surprisingly, experimental data on targets and decoys taken in an experiment
flown in June of 1997 revealed that relatively simple infrared decoys could
not be discriminated from warheads. Much of the data from this experiment
was censored by the missile defense government contractor with the knowledge
and approval of Department of Defense managers. In addition, data that
showed the system could not discriminate was concealed from scientific
review, and analysis of the remaining data was improperly altered to create
scientifically insupportable outcomes that created the appearance to
non-specialists that the kill vehicle would be able to discriminate between
warheads and decoys. This talk will describe the nature of the collusion
between Government managers and contractors, and show data that was used to
create the false case that discrimination had been demonstrated. It will
also be shown that the analysis was further fraudulently bolstered by
tampering with the experimental data, and critical science-based signature
results. In addition, evidence will be shown that the entire follow-on test
program was altered to hide the fact that the defense-system could not
function against the simplest of decoys.
Equipment Needed: Overhead Projector
Short Biographical Notes on Theodore A. Postol
THEODORE A. POSTOL is Professor of Science, Technology and National Security
Policy in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. He did
his undergraduate work in Physics and his graduate work in Nuclear
Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After receiving
his PhD, Dr. Postol joined the staff of Argonne National Laboratory, where
he studied the microscopic dynamics and structure of liquids and disordered
solids using neutron, x-ray and light scattering, along with computer
molecular dynamics techniques. Subsequently he went to the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment to study methods of basing the MX Missile,
and later worked as a scientific adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations.
After leaving the Pentagon, Dr. Postol helped to build a program at Stanford
University to train mid-career scientists to study developments in weapons
technology of relevance to defense and arms control policy. In 1990 Dr.
Postol was awarded the Leo Szilard Prize from the American Physical Society.
In 1995, he received the Hilliard Roderick Prize from the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.
Long Biographical Notes on Theodore A. Postol
Theodore A. Postol is Professor of Science, Technology, and National
Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). During
the periods prior to taking his position at MIT he worked as a research
physicist at the Argonne National Laboratory, an analyst studying the MX
missile at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, at the
Pentagon as an advisor on matters of military technology and policy to the
Chief of Naval Operations, and as a Senior Research Associate at Stanford
University's Center for International Security and Arms Control.
During the period 1982 to 1984 when Dr. Postol worked at the Pentagon he
acted as the principal advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations on ICBM/SLBM
vulnerability, including the Air Force's Closely Spaced Based (CSB) MX
deployment, the strategic applications of Navy and Air Force nuclear weapons
systems, Soviet and U.S. ballistic missile defense systems, strategic
anti-submarine warfare, strategic command, control and communications, and
advanced sensor technologies. His work on missile defense questions included
Navy requirements for reentry systems, penetration aids, and analysis of
SLBM tactical and technical countermeasures to missile defenses. His duties
also involved regular participation and/or reviews of activities within The
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Strategic Systems Projects Office, The Defense
Nuclear Agency, and The Strategic Submarine Division in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations.
His scholarly work includes technical and policy analyses of strategic and
tactical missile defenses, the potential effects of superfires from nuclear
attacks near urban areas, the possible civilian casualties from nuclear
counterforce attacks, nuclear weapons targeting practices, policy and
technical questions associated with the possibility of a Nuclear Winter
induced by fires following nuclear attacks, Accidental Launch Protection
Systems, and Soviet tactical missile threats to NATO.
Dr. Postol has also done extensive technical work on the question of the
Patriot anti-missile system's performance during the 1991 Gulf War and
technical and policy work on the implications of Highly Advanced Theater
Missile Defense Systems for the ABM Treaty. His analysis of the performance
of the Patriot system during the 1991 Gulf War is the only detailed and
refereed technical assessment of Patriot's performance during the Gulf
War -- exploiting the most extensive body of technical data available to
anyone on Patriot's Gulf War performance, video data taken by the press
during Patriot-Scud engagements. The Congressional investigation of
Department of Defense claims about Patriot's Gulf War performance revealed a
near complete failure to instrument Patriots fire units during the Gulf War,
and also the failure to exploit the rich and detailed information available
in the public video record.
In 1990 Dr. Postol received the American Physical Society's Leo Szilard
Award for "incisive technical analysis of national security issues that
[have] been vital for informing the public policy debate..." He is also the
recipient of the 1995 Hilliard Roderick Prize in Science, Arms Control, and
International Security from the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS) for "outstanding contributions that advance our understanding
of issues related to arms control and international security ... that have
important scientific or technical dimensions." During the award presentation
by the AAAS he was described as "by-far the strongest, technically-trained,
independent arms control analyst of his generation." He was also cited for
work that "has become well known and highly valued for its rigor, honesty,
and attention to detail," and for having been "a key player in educating a
whole generation of independent arms control policy analysts." The AAAS also
noted that he "has repeatedly presented accurate, but at times, unpopular
analysis to the international security and arms control community."
