[7823] in Kerberos
Re: destruction of Kerberos credentials upon logout
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Wolfgang Rupprecht)
Wed Aug 21 16:42:24 1996
To: kerberos@MIT.EDU
Date: 20 Aug 1996 23:46:26 -0700
From: wolfgang@wsrcc.com (Wolfgang Rupprecht)
hartmans@MIT.EDU (Sam Hartman) writes:
> You should send to krb5-bugs@mit.edu if you want to see it in
>the MIT release. If it's useful enough that you feel some admins
>might want to patch it into their local sites, feel free to post to
>the newsgroup as well. If there are export issues associated with the
>patch, then take whatever action you feel is appropriate.
I tend to think that its almost always a mistake to embedd policy in
hardwired code.
In the case of credential caches, its a shame that the user that
creates the credentials doesn't have more control of the nameing,
merging and destruction policies.
For example, I can see several desirable scenarios:
Per-tty cache: Every tty login/rlogin gets a separate cache.
Per-uid cache: Each uid shares a cache with all logins of the
same uid.
Per-principal cache: Each principal shares a cache with all logins
of the same kerb-principal.
Then there is the the orthogonal overwrite/merge choice:
Each new kinit/login clears the old cache by the same name and
creates a new cache from scratch.
Ech new kinit/login merges its credentials with ones already
there.
Then there is the destruction issue:
Destroy all of the cache.
Destroy only the tickets this kinit/login created directly or
indirectly.
Destroy the cache by reference count. The last guy out turns off
the lights.
It would be good to see an easy way for the user to be able to
configure these policy issues via a .krbrc file.
Just trying to thow up some ideas.
-wolfgang
--
Wolfgang Rupprecht <wolfgang@wsrcc.com> <http://www.wsrcc.com/>
PGP key available via finger, keyservers, and WWW
