[33598] in Kerberos
Re: when would you not want +requires_preauth?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Hudson)
Tue Jul 19 15:16:17 2011
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
To: Ken Dreyer <ktdreyer@ktdreyer.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAD3FbMUd4Vazq6Lbtt0s69bC=23sBZM5nhA3QeuifNu4UYuY4Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2011 15:16:11 -0400
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On Tue, 2011-07-19 at 15:01 -0400, Ken Dreyer wrote:
> I thought the "best practice" would be to set requires-preauth on
> every principal? I don't want to give someone the ability to offline
> attack any of my principals...
If I can successfully offline attack a random key, I'll just make a TGS
request for your krbtgt and attack the resulting ticket. (I'd have to
be able to authenticate as *someone* in your realm, but that's not a
very high bar.)
Luckily, nobody has the computational resources to successfully attack a
random 128-bit or larger key, and there's a reasonable argument that no
one ever will in the absence of practical quantum computing.
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