[33499] in Kerberos
CLIENT_NOT_FOUND reply to kinit a security vulnerability?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (checker)
Mon Jun 20 14:18:46 2011
From: checker <checker@d6.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2011 01:29:38 -0700 (PDT)
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Hi, I'm new to using Kerberos and I'm definitely not a security expert, and I tried searching for this but it's pretty difficult since most of the hits are about people trying to get Kerberos working, so here goes...
If I do "kinit notauser" to my KDC, it replies instantly with:
> kinit: Client not found in Kerberos database while getting initial credentials
If I "kinit realuser" then it replies by asking for the password as expected.
Doesn't this allow somebody to probe the KDC to find valid user names, which seems like a vulnerability? Other programs like SSH don't give any information away on bad usernames so you can't probe for valid ones. I thought this was a security best-practice, so I was suprised to find Kerberos doesn't do this. Or, is there a setting somewhere? Or, am I missing something?
Thanks,
Chris
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