[89437] in Cypherpunks
Re: S/MIME
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jim Gillogly)
Tue Nov 4 13:18:03 1997
Date: Tue, 04 Nov 1997 10:34:36 -0800
From: Jim Gillogly <jim@acm.org>
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Reply-To: Jim Gillogly <jim@acm.org>
Ian Clysdale wrote:
> Sorry, I'm going to continue to take a viewpoint that I suspect is
> rather unpopular in this list, and argue for the advantages of weak
> crypto in certain circumstances, when it is KNOWN to be weak. The
> phrase "Poor security is worse than no security" refers to the dangers
> in assuming that your communications are secure, even when they're
> not. If you know that your cryptography is weak, it can still
> sometimes be sufficient for your purposes. What weak cryptography does
There's a good reason this viewpoint is unpopular: it includes the tacit
assumption that strong crypto is harder to do than weak crypto. In fact
that's not the case. It's as fast and easy to do RC4/128 as to do
RC4/40 -- the only extra resource is keying material, which is cheap.
The <only> reason to use weak cryptography is political.
I'll also challenge your "If you know that your cryptography is weak"
meme:
most people have no idea what cryptography is, and at best can look at
the
little key to see if they're on a secure page. Explaining to them that
they're
not really secure is normally possible in a one-to-one tutorial, but most
people just want to get their work done, and if the program says they're
now
in secure mode, they'll feel free to send their SSN/SIN/NID and their HIV
status. They <don't> know their cryptography is weak, even if you tell
them.
Bad idea! Bad!
--
Jim Gillogly
14 Blotmath S.R. 1997, 18:27
12.19.4.11.12, 1 Eb 10 Zac, Seventh Lord of Night
