[68154] in Cypherpunks
Your editorial in the 10/14 PCWeek
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Marshall Clow)
Wed Oct 16 14:25:18 1996
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 1996 10:56:07 -0700
To: stan_gibson@zd.com
From: Marshall Clow <mclow@owl.csusm.edu>
Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com
Mr Gibson --
I'm afraid that I must disagree with your editorial in the October 14th=
issue of PC Week titled "Encryption Law Change: Good News" <http://www.pcwe=
ek.com/opinion/1014/14edit.html>. This is not a good change, but rather=
another attempt by the government to get it's "key escrow" (now renamed=
'key recovery') agenda added to commercial software products.
Let's start with the facts.=20
A) This is not a change in the law. There is no law regarding export of=
encryption software.
Congress has never passed any such law. These are State Department=
regulations, and presidential decrees. These regulations, which have the=
force of law to you and me, were never debated or voted upon by our elected=
representatives. They can be changed tomorrow the same way. In fact, they=
can be changed and the public need not even be notified.
B) The Clinton administration agreed to allow the export of unescrowed=
encryption that used 56 bit keys for six months (with up to three six month=
renewals) on the following conditions:
1) That the companies shipping the software agree (in principle) to=
incorporate 'key recovery' features in their software.
2) That the companies shipping the software make status reports to the=
government every 6 months as to their progress towards a key recovery=
scheme. If they are making satisfactory progress, their export license will=
be renewed for another six months.
3) That after two years, they discontinue selling their 56 bit software,=
and only sell the 'key recovery' software.
Condition #1 is what the Clinton Administration has been fighting for since=
1993 when it first announced the Clipper chip, the ability to recover the=
plaintext of any encrypted communication.
Condition #2 puts these companies at the mercy of a government panel which=
will decide, every six months, whether or not an internal project is=
proceeding 'satisfactorily'. If not, the company will be unable to sell=
its' encryption products abroad. This is a _big_ stick that the government=
can use to influence companies' actions.
Condition #3 requires the companies to obsolete their products in two years,=
because they will no longer be able to sell the "unescrowed" software=
abroad, and because one of the goals of "key recovery" is that it will not=
interoperate with software that does not support "key recovery".
B)
Your editorial states:
>Previous administrations have turned a deaf ear to industry pleas, as=20
>had the Clinton administration for three and a half years. Until now,=20
>the White House has toed the line drawn by law enforcement officials,=20
>which equated powerful encryption technology with munitions. Now, the=20
>administration has, under high-tech standard-bearer Vice President Al=20
>Gore, done a complete about-face.=20
>
Even if this was, as you wrote, a "complete about face", and there were no=
other conditions (such as key recovery) involved, it would still be=
inadequate. A paper written this year by a group of noted cryptologists=
titled "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate=
Commercial Security" recommends that the minimum key length for security=
today was at least 75 bits, and for data that needs to be secured for the=
next twenty years, at least 90 bit keys should be used.
The entire paper is availiable at <ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keyle=
ngth.txt> (ASCII) and <ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.ps>=
(PostScript). It is fascinating reading.
You also wrote:
>The administration plan also calls for private companies to surrender=20
>encryption keys should court orders demand them.=20
>
This is incomplete and misleading. The original Clipper press release,=
(availiable at <http://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper/white_house_statement_4_=
93.txt> ) states:
>Q: Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on
> a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation
> encrypted using the device. What would they have to do to
> decipher the message?
>
>A: They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a
> court order, to do the wiretap in the first place. They
> would then present documentation of this authorization to
> the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and
> obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug
> smugglers. The key is split into two parts, which are
> stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key
> escrow system.
>
Please note the word "normally".
The Clinton Administration, even though repeatedly asked, has never=
explained what consitutes an abnormal case, and what they would consider=
authorization in that case.
This was not a typo. This Q&A was part of an official White House press rele=
ase.
C) What exactly is "key recovery"? How does it work?
No one knows. The White House press release doesn't say. The idea is that=
the 11 vendor coalition will work out the methodology, and the White House=
will "approve" it. This is, in my mind, one of the slickest moves in the=
whole situation. The administration has taken a problem that they have been=
unable to solve to the satisfaction of the computer industry (access to all=
encrypted communications), and suddenly, it's not the administration's=
problem any more! It's the computer industry's problem!
=46rom an article in a recent ComputerWorld: (<http://www.computerworld.com/=
search/AT-html/9610/961014SL42crypto.html>)
>And speaking of failures to communicate, take IBM, which recently teamed=20
>with 10 companies to develop technology for a "key-recovery" system=20
>intended to satisfy the new export criteria.
>
>Through some mysterious process, the scheme will allow the government to=20
>get encryption keys when it needs them, without having to hold them "in=20
>escrow" the Clipper approach.
>
>Why "mysterious? IBM's press release announcing the initiative was four=20
>pages of self-congratulatory drivel with almost no information about=20
>what the companies would develop or how it would work.
>
>Reminded of the secret Clipper algorithm, I sought details from IBM. I=20
>asked a spokeswoman why the company hadn't just put out a nice, snappy=20
>white paper explaining its new approach to key recovery.
>
>"We spent three months trying to do that, quite literally," the=20
>spokeswoman said. "It's pretty confusing stuff, and whenever we get it=20
>on paper, we aren't happy with it."
>
> Observers believe that if the 56-bit experiment proves successful,=20
>relaxation of the restriction that still covers 128-bit key software=20
>will follow. This could take place two years hence.
>
Who are these "observers"? They don't seem very observant to me.
The government has stated that the export of unescrowed 56 bit encryption=
software is a temporary measure, and will be prohibited again (at the very=
latest) on Jan 1, 1999. At that time, the only (medium or) strong=
encryption software that will be allowed to be exported will be that which=
supports "key recovery".
In conclusion, this is not a "refreshing change of direction" for the=
Clinton administration. This was "more of the same", albeit better=
disguised. The 11 companies who signed up for this coalition are receiving=
very little (56 bit export for at most two years), in exchange for giving=
up control of their encryption technologies to the government forever.
If hou have any questions, I would be glad to speak to you further.
-- Marshall
Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu>
"It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling
into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from
falling into error."
--Justice Robert Jackson, _American Communication Association v Douds_,
343 U.S. 306, 325 [1952] [via ed.nelson@SYSLINK.MCS.COM]
