[118516] in Cypherpunks

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Re: Postulates for "trusted"/"maliced" soft and hard ware

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (David Honig)
Thu Sep 30 14:23:52 1999

Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1999 13:55:52 -0400
Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.19990930104736.007d1460@pop.sprynet.com>
From: David Honig <honig@sprynet.com>
To: Multiple recipients of list <cypherpunks@openpgp.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Reply-To: David Honig <honig@sprynet.com>

At 08:11 PM 9/29/99 -0400, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>Well a fab is not needed to trust the chips. I have been thinking about
>this quite a bit with the recent discussions on Intel's RNG. If the CPU is
>open sourced then all that is needed is a lab with equipment to examine
>the chips to see if what the fab is producing matches what's in  the
>published specs. Granted this is beyond my capabilities but is a less
>expensive proposal than producing one's own chips.

Yep.

Chipworks.com does this.  

Prediction: The security-hardware industry will eventually
support a cryptoHW UL lab, much as someone from the l0pht suggested
a crypto software UL lab.  A civilian, US-independent version of the
ISSO.  (Note that the NSA/ISSO is organizing about 7 "certified assurance" 
labs (in the US) to outsource (control?) security evals.  That's too much
tentacle for many to stomache.)









  






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