[117860] in Cypherpunks
chips, trust, etc.
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Anonymous)
Mon Sep 13 11:58:40 1999
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1999 17:40:16 +0200 (CEST)
Message-Id: <199909131540.RAA04311@mail.replay.com>
From: Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>
To: cypherpunks@algebra.com
Reply-To: Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>
At 01:05 AM 9/13/99 -0700, Gary Jeffers wrote:
> It seems to me that to have real computer security it is necessary
>to have at least 1 CPU chip trusted.
*Ding*
> It might be possible to put a modest CPU chip in line with the
>powerful, modern "maliced" chips in order to "cage" them. The
Brian Snow of the NSA/ISSO mentioned the utility of 'islands'
of trust inside untrusted systems at CHES '99.
trusted
>chip would encrypt and decrypt the data flowing to and from the
>"maliced" chip. There could be several cheap trusted chips in a system.
>At the very least, the trusted chips could prevent "maliced" systems
>from sending and receiving "malice" strings.
The use is more like having the trusted subsystem
manage keys, possibly manage the 'red' traffic,
and the untrusted host does other things.
> Would it be practical for a huge State to force CPU chip
>manufacturers to design their chips with backdoors?
There are a lot of people at the Fabs who need green cards.
-Kipple
