[117854] in Cypherpunks

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Postulates for "trusted"/"maliced" soft and hard ware - w/o html

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Gary Jeffers)
Mon Sep 13 02:35:50 1999

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From: "Gary Jeffers" <jeffers@htc.net>
To: <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net>
Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1999 01:09:55 -0700
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Reply-To: "Gary Jeffers" <jeffers@htc.net>

      POSTULATES FOR "TRUSTED"/"MALICED" SOFT AND HARD WARE

1. NSA CHIPPING: The NSA either already has or soon will have the
   major cpu chip makers design in backdoors to be opened by
   signal strings over the Internet. This is too elegant and too
   cheap on a per target basis to pass up.

2. The ESSENTIAL TRUSTED CHIP. Computer security demands trusted chips.
   A trusted chip is a cpu chip that is known to be free of backdoors.

3. Hardware trumps software. Software is usually blind to back-
   doors in hardware. On the other hand, trusted chips can
   rescue us from backdoored hardware and software.

4. Secure, Hard, System Nucelli are essential. With the many chips
   and millions of bytes of executable binaries on modern computers,
   only computer systems that are subdivided with trusted chip
   sentinels can be secure from backdoors.

5. The backdoor assumption. You must assume that your system has at
   least one backdoor in it. This assumption will give you the
   possibility of defeating an installed backdoor.

Question?: Is there currently such a thing as a cpu chip of
which we can be sure of its architecture?
Could there be in theory? If you had a trusted one, could you
use it to test another cpu chip?

Yours Truly,
Gary Jeffers

BEAT STATE!!!!



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