[117536] in Cypherpunks
IP: two more on NSA KEy one from Spafford and one from MS
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Robert Hettinga)
Sun Sep 5 09:17:27 1999
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Date: Sun, 5 Sep 1999 08:24:39 -0400
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
From: Robert Hettinga <rah@shipwright.com>
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Date: Sat, 4 Sep 1999 16:01:52 -0400
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From: David Farber <farber@cis.upenn.edu>
Subject: IP: two more on NSA KEy one from Spafford and one from MS
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Date: Sat, 4 Sep 1999 11:49:52 -0500
To: farber@cis.upenn.edu
From: Gene Spafford <spaf@cs.purdue.edu>
Subject: Re: IP: Some more on "nsakey"
Cc: ip-sub-1@admin.listbox.com
Well, it is always easier to believe a conspiracy theory or dark designs.
However, there may be alternative explanations.
For instance, I happen to know that various 3-letter agencies use a
lot of Windows machines (in a sense, that should be scary all by
itself :-). Suppose they want to load their own highly-classified,
very closely-guarded version of their own crypto routines. Do you
think they will send copies of their code out to Redmond to get it
signed so it can be loaded? Or are they going to sign it
themselves, with their own key, doing it in-house where it is "safe"?
If they are going the in-house route, then either Microsoft needs to
share the private key with them (bad idea), or the code needs to
accommodate a second key schedule generated inside the TLA. Hmmm,
that sounds familiar, doesn't it?
Another explanation, that I may have read here (this issue has been
discussed on many lists) is that to get the approval for export, the
folks at MS needed to include a "back-up" key in case the first was
compromised in some way. They would need to switch over to using the
alternate key for all the systems already out there. But how would
they do that unless the second key was already installed, so they
could do the switch using that second key? So, if you were MS, and
the NSA required you to install a backup key like this, what would
you call it?
Of course, it could be that MS wanted the backup key themselves, and
the programmer involved in the coding decided to name it something
silly.
Or, there is a history of MS code being shipped with undocumented
code elements, and things that MS management don't know are present.
Suppose the code (involving only a few lines of code) was placed
there by an agent of the intelligence services of some other country
(it wouldn't be that hard to subvert an existing employee or place
one at MS with good coding skills who could eventually gain access to
the appropriate code). He/she names the variables with "NSA" in
place in case anyone doing a code review would question it -- and
includes a comment block that says "The NSA required this to be here
-- do not change or ask questions." The "sinister purpose" might be
correct, but you are blaming the wrong entity.
Heck, maybe this is a grand design of Mr. Gates himself: after all,
he's certainly having some aggravation from the U.S. Justice
Department!
There are other possible explanations for the name, too.
These alternate explanations do not mean that the extra key does not
have side-effects (such as clandestine installation and circumvention
of the export controls). And of course, we will probably never
know what the primary reason for this key is, nor will we know what
role these side-effects may have had in the decision, despite what
people eventually claim.
The key thought is that there are possible scenarios for the naming
of the key that do not involve nefarious activity, or do not involve
such activity by the NSA. That should not be the immediate
conclusion people reach.
And, at the risk of starting some tirades, let me ask a (rhetorical)
question: even if it was put there for purposes of clandestine
monitoring, what is wrong with that? If this gets used to monitor
terrorists with NBC weapons, drug cartels, or weapons labs in Iraq,
isn't that what we want done? In that light, there should be some
concern that this has now been exposed and possibly nullified! The
history of cryptography shows -- repeatedly -- that having crypto
assets makes a huge difference in times of conflict, and that getting
such assets in place and working takes time. It would be naive to
believe that there are no such threats looming, or that there is no
such likelihood in the future.
We should be clear in our discussions as to whether our concern is
the presence of the code, or over who may have control of it. Is
the issue really one of what controls are in place that ensure that
the code isn't used against inappropriate targets (e.g., law-abiding,
friendly businesses and citizens)? Unfortunately, we don't have
strong assurances in this realm, and there have been some past abuses
(or alleged abuses). But that may be moot if the code was actually
placed for some other group's dark design.
--spaf
>From: "the terminal of Geoff Goodfellow" <geoff@iconia.com>
>To: "Dave e-mail pamphleteer Farber" <farber@cis.upenn.edu>
>
>Microsoft Says Speculation About Security and NSA is 'Inaccurate and
>Unfounded'
>PR Newswire, Sep 3 20:35
>
>REDMOND, Wash., Sept. 3 /PRNewswire/ -- Microsoft Corp. said today that
>speculation about Microsoft(R) Windows(R) security and the U.S. National
>Security Agency (NSA) is "inaccurate and unfounded."
>
>In response to speculation by a Canadian cryptography company that Microsoft
>had somehow allowed the NSA to hold a "backdoor" key to the encryption
>framework in its Windows operating system, Microsoft issued the following
>statement:
>
>"This report is inaccurate and unfounded. The key in question is a Microsoft
>key. It is maintained and safeguarded by Microsoft, and we have not
>shared this
>key with the NSA or any other party.
>
>"Microsoft takes security very seriously. This speculation is ironic since
>Microsoft has consistently opposed the various key escrow proposals suggested
>by the government because we don't believe they are good for consumers, the
>industry or national security.
>
>"Contrary to this report, the key in question would not allow
>security services
>to be started or stopped without the user's knowledge."
>
>Microsoft said the key is labeled "NSA key" because NSA is the
>technical review
>authority for U.S. export controls, and the key ensures compliance with U.S.
>export laws. The company reiterated that Microsoft has not shared
>this key with
>the NSA or any other company or agency.
>
>Founded in 1975, Microsoft (NASDAQ:MSFT) is the worldwide leader in software
>for personal computers. The company offers a wide range of products and
>services for business and personal use, each designed with the mission of
>making it easier and more enjoyable for people to take advantage of the full
>power of personal computing every day.
>
>NOTE: Microsoft and Windows are either registered trademarks or trademarks of
>Microsoft Corp. in the United States and/or other countries. Other product and
>company names herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. SOURCE
>Microsoft Corp.
>-0- 09/03/1999
>/NOTE TO EDITORS: If you are interested in viewing additional information on
>Microsoft, please visit the Microsoft Web page at
>http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/ on Microsoft's corporate information
>pages./
>
>/CONTACT: press only, Jennifer Todd of Waggener Edstrom, 425-637-9097, or
>jtodd@wagged.com, for Microsoft; or Mark Murray of Microsoft, 425-936-3306, or
>mmurray@microsoft.com/
>
>=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
>Geoff_Goodfellow@iconia.com, Prague CZ * tel/mobil +420 (0)603 706 558
>"Success is getting what you want & happiness is wanting what you get"
>http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/01/biztech/articles/17drop.html
--- end forwarded text
-----------------
Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
