[117481] in Cypherpunks
RE: NSA key in MSFT Crypto API
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Lucky Green)
Fri Sep 3 21:53:09 1999
From: "Lucky Green" <shamrock@cypherpunks.to>
To: <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1999 18:44:15 -0700
Message-ID: <NDBBIFGOKODBCKDGJDKLAEFACFAA.shamrock@cypherpunks.to>
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Reply-To: "Lucky Green" <shamrock@cypherpunks.to>
Anon wrote:
> Also see this from Matt Blaze, which may help to quench the flames:
>
> : If the NSA wanted Microsoft to
> : quietly compromise the CAPI install mechanism (which is supposed to
> : require Microsoft's digital signature on the installed module -
> : thereby preventing the installation of non-US crypto and allowing CAPI
> : OS's to be exported), it would be *much* easier to do any of
> the following:
> : - Convince MS to tell them the secret key for MS's signature key
> : - Get MS to sign an NSA-compromised module.
> : - Install some module other than CAPI to compromise the OS (only
> : CAPI modules require the signature).
And chances are *all* of this has been done. Intelligence agencies like to
not just compromise one component. Their objective is to compromise all
components they can possibly compromise. Doing so is really just an
expression of failover redundancy.
See my recent post about the numerous holes in the GSM cryptosystems.
--Lucky
